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CHAFT:EE I 
INTRODUCTION 
1. The Problem of __ the . Thesis. 
The problem of this thesis is to compare critically 
the major ontological questions which serve to distinguish 
two outstanding schools of philosophy that represent the 
realistic development of thought. These two schools which 
developed nearly two millennia apart are referred to as Pla-
tonic Realism and N-eo-Realism. However, these schools were 
related to one another more than in name due to a mutual 
ontological bias, so that taken together they represent 
two of the foremost attempts to defend a realistic position. 
Although the problems dealt with by each of the re-
alistic schools were neither unique nor original, the an-
swers which these realists gave to these problems contained 
both uniqueness and originality. Some of these problems 
related to such matters as ontological extensity, novelty, 
linguistics, the subordinate position of epistemology, and 
the nature of error--for each of which distinct explanations 
are offered by both realistic schools. More precisely, 
these problems became prominent as a consequence of the 
latter-day Nee-Realist's refusal to accept the ontological 
limi tations:· imposed by the theory of the earlier Platonic 
realists. In light of this refusal, ontological speculation 
1 
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stands as a decisive cleavage between the Platonic Realists 
and the Neo-Realists. Accordingly, the particular theory of 
ontology held by each of these schools must come under exam-
ination for purposes of evaluating their claims. Although 
Plato believed in the existence of a separate world of Ideas, 
these Ideas that he believed ought to enjoy existence were 
selective, generally based upon moral and mathematical qual-
ities of excellence. The Nee-Realists accepted the basic 
Platonic position concerning a separate existence of Ideas, 
but found no good reason to limit the extent of such treat-
ment. Moreover, the Neo-Realists believed that the preva il-
ing view of relations among recent logicians would uphold 
their extension of Plato 1 s original doctrine. For these 
and other reasons the ontological presuppositions as held 
by each of the realistic schools must be examined in order-
that they may be understood. That the problems dealt with 
by the realists have, in varying forms, been recurrent 
throughout the history of philosophy lends attention as 
well as importance to the nature of this thesis as a mat-
ter for current investigation. 
2. Definitions ~Limitations. 
The term "realism1 is fraught with complexities, 
thus tending to make its use in modern idiom undesirably 
loose and ambiguous, unless specifically designated. Hence, 
in dealing with the present subject, a general description 
i s first necessary in order to avoid misinterpretation. 
The description given here applies to those areas of real-
ism that come within the scope of this thesis. 
a. Nalve Realism, often referred to as the belief of the 
man in the street, expresses the broad, uncritical view 
that mind can know something other than itself; that this 
something else is known directly; and, that what is known 
directly is all that can be known. 
b. Platonic Realism: . . the view expressed by Plato asserting 
a metaphysical dualism, dividing reality into a world of 
immaterial, permanent, and unchanging Ideas, and a world of 
physical, transitory, and mutable things. The Ideas are on-
tologically independent of physical reality. Knowledge for 
the Platonist is a highly structured, rational process 
whereby the Ideas are apprehended as the ultimate being. 
c. Neo-Realism is the view held by a group known as the 
Six Realists who believed in a metaphysical pluralism, 
epistemological monism., and a relational theory of con-
sciousness. For the Neo-Realists, 
3 
the content of knowledge, that which lies in or before 
the mind when knowledge takes place, is numerically 
identical with the thing known. Knowledge by inter-
mediaries is not denied, but is made subordinate to 
direct or presentative knowledge. There is no special 
class of entities, qualitatively or substantially dis-
tinguished from all other entities, as a media of knowl-
edge. 
1 . Holt~ al., NR, 34-35. This and all subsequent footnotes 
are made by citing the author's name, the initials of the 
important words of the title, and the page number from which 
the reference is taken. A complete bibliography appears at 
the end of the thesis, alphabetically arranged by author. 
d . Cri tical __ Realism: .. a view which arose as a reaction to 
Neo-Realism and which forwards the belief that 
physical things exist independently of being known; 
that they may be our objects, but that they are never 
our mental content; that they differ in some respects 
from the quality-groups of our perceptions {e.g. in 
not possessing the secondary qualities which we find 
in our percepts); but that they stand in some causal 
relation to our percepts; that it is possible for sci-
ence to investigate some of these relations and some 
of the relations between physical things, and thus 
gain truftworthy knowledge concerning the laws of their 
actions. 
The terms 11 realism11 and 11Realistic 11 will be used throughout 
the thesis to refer to the movement or school under consid-
eration; the actual designation .will be clear from the con-
text. 
The thesis will limit itself generally to the onto-
logical nature of realism, with an account of the epistem-
ological theory subsumed by each school. No attempt vtill 
be made to account for the other major philosophical areas 
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of inquiry as they relate to realism, namely, logic, history, 
ethics, axiology, and aesthetics. No reference will be made 
to other recent developments or movements that might be call-
ed "realistic" in nature, such as the curr ent revival of 
Thomistic doctrine by Professor Wild and his colleagues who 
refer to themselves as "realists." A second and more prob-
lematic limitation is imposed in treating the modern real-
istic school as a corporate unity, instead of considering 
1. Pratt, Art.(l920), 109. 
) 
each author individua,lly. Actually, a variety of writers 
formed this modern school of realism, and the agreement 
among them concerning the primary tenets of Nee-Realism 
was often more apparent than real. This situation was lat-
er brought out since serious discrepancies became evident 
when these writers extended their views beyond a relative-
ly superficial statement. In keeping with such a limita-
tion, the dialogues of Plato and the cooperative volume, 
The _New_Realism, published by the American realists,will 
serve as the central statement of their respective views. 
3. The Method of the Thesis. 
- - -.--
The method to be used will be descriptive, compara-
tive, critical, and summary, in that order. The descriptive 
chapters, IL and III, will deal with the basic ontological 
position of each of the realistic schools, giving attention 
to the important tenets of each school such that these may 
later be pinpointed for a more detailed treatment. The 
fourth chapter attempts to show the outstanding similarities 
and dissimilarities which arise in both views of conceptual 
realism, pointing out where the implications arising from 
these differences become the basis for important issues. 
Chapter V directs itself to the task of examining the ade-
quacy of the realistic position in terms of both the inter-
nal structure of each school and of their mutual reliance 
upon an extra world of universals. The principle of possi-
5 
bility offered by the modern realists as a modification 
to the more restricted ontology of early, Platonic real-
ism is reviewed with attention given to the important ob-
jections created by such an explanation. Finally, the 
conclusions of the thesis are briefly summarized. 
This method, it is believed, offers sufficient 
scope to the questions raised by conceptual realism to 
allow a critical appraisal based upon documented material. 
The emphasis, however, is given over to some of the more 
important qualifying conditions which tend to limit the 
applic ation and value of conceptual realism. In the last 
analysis, the thesis is designed to highlight these qual-
ifying conditions. 
6 
CHAPT:EB II 
PLATO'S DOCTRINE OF IDEAS 
1. The .. Basic Doctrine. 
The impact of Plato's teachings upon modern thought 
is perhaps best summarized by Whitehead in the vivid and 
often quoted statement that "European philosophical tradi-
tion ••• consists of a series of footnotes to Plato." 1 Arm-
ed with this generalization, one may venture to say further 
that the doctrine of Ideas lies at the heart of every dia-
logue which Plato wrote and has, therefore, had major influ-
ence. This influence, however, itself requires much foot-
noting. Plato's many critics have supplied these footnotes 
in abundance, and have, with certain qualifications, treated 
the doctrine of Ideas as the central point of departure to 
all other elements of his philosophy: mathematical, ethical, 
political, aesthetic, epistemological, and metaphysical. It 
is with the last of these, the ontological aspect, that this 
chapter will deal. 
Historically speaking, the germ of the theory of Ideas 
had been expressed long before the writing of the dialogues. 
On the one hand, the view was already popular that nothing 
in the universe was abiding; everything was in a state of 
flux. Reality was spoken of by Heraclitus as being like a 
1. Whitehead, PR, 63. 
7 
r iver which constantly flows, never ceasing in its movement. 
One "could not step twice in the same rivers; for other and 
yet other waters are ever flowing on." 1 On the other hand, 
the contrary of this view was expressed by Parmenides with 
equal vigor and certitude, according to which fixity of be-
ing was the ultimate category in the universe. Change on 
this view was an illusion since real being is incapable of 
differentiation. These antinomous views, each claiming to 
express the most fundamental truth about reality, continued 
to influence, if not domina.te, early Greek thought, until 
the advent of Plato. 
When faced with the problem of deciding which, if 
either, or both, of these opposing views beet explained 
reality,2 Plato found what he believed a satisfactory an-
swer through seizing, as it were, both horns of the dilemma. 
Beginning with the universe as a whole, Plato "bifurcates 
the universe into two departments. The first is a flux of 
change, Heracleitue's world; the second a changeless real-
ity, Parmenides::' e. n3 Broadly speaking, Plato conceived of 
the Heraclitean explanation as sufficient to understand the 
nature of phenomenal experience, yet the Parmenidean explan-
ation was both necessary and sufficient to discern the ident-
ically recurring characteristics peculiar to conceptual ex-
1. Nahm, SEGP, 91. 
2. Taylor, PMW, 352. 
3. Joad, GTP, 271. 
8 
perience. It is this second explanation, this changeless 
reality, which becomes the basis for the Platonic doctrine 
of Ideas; a world, moreover, which is membered by these: very 
]L Ideas or Forms. 
9 
This world of Ideas, Plato tells us, is where there 
abides all true being with which Knowledge is concerned; 2 a 
world that is membered by Ideas which are colorless, form-
less, intangible essences visible only to the mind. 3 Jus-
tice, beauty, good, greatness, and "the essence or true nature 
of everything" abide in this world--all pure and absolute in 
4 ' their being. Plato defines these essences as "always what 
I 
they are, having the same simple self existent and unchang-
ing Forms, not admitting of variation at all, or in any way, 
or at any time."5 They are, "as it were, patterns fixed in 
nature, and other things are like them, and resemblances of 
them." 6: On at least one occasion, Plato assumes that there: 
exists a "single essential nature or Form for every set ot 
things which we call by the same name,"tet on another occa-
sion, he denies that there are Forms corresponding to such 
vile things as hair, mud, and dirt. 8 Upon the basis of this 
1. Shorey, PAM, 99. "In Plato ••• idea and form are synonyms." 
2. Jowett, DOP, I, 453 (Phaedrus 247). 
3. Ibid. 
4. Jowett, DOP, II~  204 (Phfiedo 65). 
5. Jowett, DOP, II, 221 (Phaedo 78). 
6. Jowett, DOP, IV, 52 (Parmenides· 132). 
7. Cornford, RP, 325 (Republic 596). References to Plato's 
The Republic will be taken from this work; all other ref-
erences will be taken from the Jowett translations. 
8. J owett, DOP, IV, 49 (Parmenides 130). 
partial description an ontology evolved which has persisted 
to the present day, both in several modified versions, and 
in Plato's original presentation. To give an adequate ac-
count of this ontology, and hence a more complete understand-
ing of the Platonic doctrine, it is important to make clear 
even further those characteristics by which the Ideas ma~ 
be identified. 
10 
First among such characteristics which may be ascribed 
to the Ideas is the notion of abstractness, or incorporealitx. 1 
On Plato's view the Forms are not physical objects, rather, 
the "Forms are objects of thought." 2 Because: these Ideas 
"transcend time and are not in spa~e"3 this feature is a prop• 
erty common to all the Ideas. The abstract feature here in-
controvertibly sets the Ideas apart from any particular exem--
plification of them. Any spoken language is to a large extent 
based upon the persistent meaning which these abstract terms 
express. The properties designated by such terms as "justice," 
"beauty," and "good" are but three examples of this incorpo-
real being. Yet incorporeality doea:not imply not having a 
reality. The Ideas are quite real and are, in fact, always 
considered to be more real than the particulars in which they 
4 
manifest themselves, and upon which particulars are depend-
ent for their form. It becomes evident that because of the 
1. Windelband, HP, 117-118. 
2. Cornford, RP, 218 (Republic 507). 
3. Ross, PTI, 232. 
4. Demos, POP, 178. Also se~: Burnet, Pla., 41. 
dependence of the particular upon the Idea, some sort of in-
teraction between the two must take place. This interaction 
will be treated more fully later, but for the present it is 
of critical importance never to confuse the abstract charac -
ter of the Ideas with the concrete character of phenomenal 
entities. For example, 
take blueness. Blueness: as conceived is one thing, 
and blueness as perceived is another; the perceived 
blueness varies with each perception, but the con-
ceived blueness remains the same. The perceived qual-
ity is not only unique, it is also impure; the blue 
of the water is mixed with other colors. Moreover, 
the embodied quality falls short of the quality as 
conceived. The ideal line is completely straight; 
the actual line never. Thus universals may be call-
ed abstractions, if the word abstraction bi use4 neu-
trally, without derogation as to realness. 
From such a view, any attempt at a phenomenalistic or phys-
icalistic account of the Ideas would be entirely contrary 
to the spirit of .Plato's intention. Whether or not Plato 
fully escapes this indictment will be brought out later; 
however, in keeping with the intended meaning of the Ideas 
in terms of their intrinsic nature, it may be said that par-
ticular space-time objects are but clue-givers to this na-
ture. No less important to understand is that the Ideas 
help structure, so to speak, our interpretation of such ob-
jects, and thus provide a kind of ideational or ontological 
cement for our physicalistic bricks. 
Another characteristic which may be predicated of 
each participat ing member of the Realm of Ideas is that of 
1. Demos, POP, 179. 
11 
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individuation, whereby each Idea may be thought of as a dis-
tinct, unique individual. 1 Plato tells us that there exists 
a "sinp;le . essential nature or Form for every set of things 
which we call by the same na.me."2 Moreover, if the Ideas 
have this characteristic, then they are to be·: "taken in self-
identity, in isolation, JC~fLS • The one has no parts, and 
the exclusion 9f the parts is found to shut out ali predi-
cates that imply multiplicity, space, time, or number."3 The 
Idea according to such a feature bears with it a notion of 
"selfhood11 whereby it has an intrinsic content, 4 and it is 
due to this intrinsic character that one may go a step fur-
ther to say that the Ideas function as things-in-themselve~. 
Both the self-identical and separate aspects ascribed to the 
Ideas invoke, then, an individuating character necessary to 
understand them properly. Yet an ambivalence is involved 
here, for such an understanding does not mean in vacuo. ''Each 
Lror~in i tself is one; but they manifest themselves in a 
great variety of combinations, with actions, with material 
things, and with one another." 5 However, even when the 
"Forms commune with one another ••• each Form is one. Com-
munion is not f u sion; in their mutual interrelations, the 
6 Forms preserve their self-identity.n 
1. Stewart, PDI, 112-113. 
2. Cornford, RP, 325 (Republic 596), italics mine. 
3. Shorey, WPS, 292. 
4. Demos, POP, 191. 
5. Cornford, RP, 183 (Republic 476). 
6~ Demos, POP, 191. 
A third characteristic important in a description of 
the Ideas is that of eternality. This reference is to that 
of in _perpetuum, meaning that the Ideas are eternal in that 
they transcend time and, as a coroll:ary, last throughout ~ it. 
The Ideas which Plato designated as timeless more often than 
not were class concepts which, while having members or in-
13 
stances, were never completely exhibited in their space-t~e 
counterpart. This becomes increasingly apparent when speak-
ing of perishables, for "it is certain that at no time would 
h~LPlat~have said that there is a separate Idea answering 
to each perishable individual." 1 Subsumed. under this refer-
ence is a further descriptive quality: changelesaness. The 
Idea retains its selfhood because : of its individual quality, 
but does so without changing in any way. "A beautiful face 
changes, but Beauty itself is unchangeable. If it were not 
unchangeable, we could not think it, or give it a name." 2 
In short, Ideas are not subject to the laws of time and of 
change as are phenomena; they are eternal and changelessr. 
Due in part to their abstract character and in part 
to the timelessness of the Ideas, latter day critics of Plato 
began referring to the Ideas as universals._ . Not only does 
the term "universaltt satisfy the descriptive meaning of a 
distinct class of e~tities,3 but further aids in making 
1. Ross, PTI, 170. 
2. Stewart, PDI, 38. 
3. Ros s , PTI, 225. 
c lear one's meaning when alluding to the complementary, but 
distinct, Realm of Particulars. In this second sense, the 
universals are both descriptive of particulars1 and serve as 
principles "by virtue of which the actual world is criticized 
and evaluated; thus a universal is prescriptive of particu-
2-lara." It is to be seen, then, that the Ideas have a dual 
function: they are both classes and characteristics.3 This 
may be illustrated when invoking the notion that two plus 
two make four. Not only may this notion be prescriptive in 
that it characterizes certain pairs of particulars; but, too, 
it retains as autonomy, a 11 selfhood11 as a universal, which 
- -
allows us to "perceive from the nature of the system or num-
bers this must be so; and what is true of 12 and 2 make 4' 
.. 4 -
is true of the most advanced mathematical propositions." 
14 
To summarize those important features that may be 
attributed to the Ideas: "the essenc~ of the theory of Ideas 
lay ••• in the recognition of the fact that ther e is a clas~ 
or entities, for which the best name is probably 'universals', 
that are entirely different from sensible things.tl5 And 
since the Realm of Ideas was, according to Plato, unaffected 
by transitory and mutable things, or by becoming, the Ideas 
them selves may best be characterized as "eternal and immut-
1. Demos, POP, 177. 
2. Ibid. 
3. Ibid. t 117". 
4'. Ross, PTI, 225-226. 
s. I bid., 117. 
able, present always and everywhere, self-identical, self-
existent, absolute, separate, simple, without beginning or 
end," 1 denoted by a significant universal term. 2 
2. Membership in the J~ealm " QL Ideas. 
In attempting to specify precisely what entities on 
Plato's view were recognized as Ideas and those which were-
not, one is faced with the evolutionary character of Plato's 
writings.3 Inconveniently, for his readers, Plato made no 
record or listing of precisely those Ideas which he held t o 
be necessary to his system--to do so would have been out of 
character with his considered intent as a philosopher. Nor, 
we are told, "is there in the dialogues any intimation that 
he had attempted to announce a definite criterion for the 
selection of those class-concepts that were to be regarded 
as Ideas."~ :Moreover, one discovers that it is not the case 
that even 
the examples which he LPlat27 adduces permit such a 
principle to be recognized; we can only say that it 
seems as if in the course of time he continually em-
phasized more strongly the attributes expressing worth 
(as in the good and the beautiful), the mathematical 
1 . Fuller, HP, f, 130. 
2. Taylor, PI, 34. 
15 
3. It is important to mention that the evolutionary charac-
ter of Plato's writings brought about a shift of emphasis 
with respect to the Ideas which he recognized, and not·. a 
rejection of such Ideas. One critic points to this in 
saying that "there is no real evidence that there was a 
later theory . of Ideas in which Plato denied the existence 
of Ideas which he had earlier recognized." See: Rosa, PTI, 
175. 
4. Windelband, HP, 121. 
• 
relations (greatness and smallness. numerical determ-
inations,1etc.), and the types of species in the organ-
ic world. 
Despite the vaguenesa suggested in Plato's method by this 
passage, there ar~ certain classes, or categories, of Ideas 
which best incorporate the vast body of Ideas about which 
Plato wrote. Three general categories stand out: Ideas of 
qualities and relatione, Ideas of negative notions, and Ideas 
2 
of sensible objects. 
i. Ideas of Qualities and Relations. 
The evidence present in the dialogues gives over-
whelming testimony to the fact that qualities and relations 
make up a considerable portion of the Realm of Ideas. To 
substantiate this in part, one need only to recall that the 
dialectical . technique used· by Plato directs itself to a de-
finitive description of certain mathematical or moral qual-
ities in many, if not most, of the dialogues. The cardinal 
virtues mentioned in The Republic " are a case in point. A 
general rule which governs the area of both mathematical 
s,nd moral qualities may be stated: there is n a Form for each 
16 
of the qualities which may be possessed of a number of things 
in common. 11 3 
This may suggest that the Ideas, rather than having 
a nsimplen character, try . to support a complexity beyond their 
1. Windelband, HP, 121 • 
2. Such a division is not arbitrary. Ritter, for example, 
c lassifies the Ideas as logical categories, concepts of 
moral and aesthetic qualities, concepts of concrete objects. 
3. Joad, GTP, 281. 
• 
means to do so. Such is misleading. That an Idea may coa-
lesce with other Ideas, that is to say, "commune" or inter-
17 
relate with other Ideas, is patent without becoming or fusing 
with that Idea, or complex of Ideas:, to which it is related. 1 
Thus it is admissible to conceive ·or certain Ideas in a rela-
tional complex, or bound by some compound relational charac-
teristic, since ultimately the terms of the relation, or com-
plex, would be quality Ideas. The Idea of Sunhood may desig-
nate the compound relational characteristic of yellow-round-
bright-hot, but such a characteristic is amenable to a partial 
reduction, at least to the extent that the terms "yellow," 
"round," "bright," and "hot" describe its simple qualities. 
In such a case the ultimate terms eo treated may be considered 
as "simples." From this view it is suggested that simples 
form a strong basis in determining the number of Ideas which 
would populate Plato's Realm. Just how many such simples 
there are, however, is yet to be discovered. 
Whereas it may be impracticable to circumscribe arbi-
trarily, and thus limit the possible Ideas of qualities that 
may justly be recognized under Plato's view, a listing of such 
Ideas of qualities could not be extended indefinitely for at 
least two reasons. The first of these becomes evident if one 
accepts Windelband's conjecture that Plato seemed to restrict 
through emphasis the designation of those Ideas expressing 
attributes of worth. The second: the point at which Ideas of 
1. Demos, POP, 191. 
qualities end and Ideas of relations begin is at best vague. 
As one finds in reading the Phaedo, the Ideas of equality 
and inequality are primary examples of Ideas that may be 
1 
called relative. These and others, such as sameness and 
difference, must be admitted to membership in the Realm; and 
this inclusion not only introduces additional constituents,, 
thus increasing the population of the Realm, but further 
ser ves to suggest a distinct class of Ideas, namely, that 
of purely relative terms of which Plato "seems never to have 
denied the existence."2 
11. Ideas of Negative Notions. 
A second and considerably more complex category of 
Idea s 1s encountered when dealing with negative notions. 
Under this category many distinct views worthy of mention 
have been advanced by the critics, particularly those by 
Roes . The first of these views is that 11 not-being (which. 
is identified with difference) is a genuine Form, indeed 
one of the greatest Forms.":; At once several possible in-
terpretations arise concerning this view, none of which 
find conclusive support in the dialogues. It is possible, 
on the one hand, to say that 11 purely negative terms like 
'not-beautiful,' 'not good' stand for specific Ideas em-
braced under the generic Idea of not-being or difference. 114 
1. Jowett, DOP, II, 215-217 (Phaedo 74, 75). 
2. Ross, PTI, 281. 
3 . Ibid., 168. 
4. Ibid. 
18 
\~ 
• 
On the other hand, it ts quite possible to interpret the 
Idea of not-being, or difference, as being "parcelled out 
among all individual things that are not beautiful or are 
not good."l Perhaps some combination or synthesis of the 
two interpretations just mentioned might better describe 
the intended meaning of the original view, since the Ideas 
19 
function both as classes and characteristics. Nevertheless, 
the important qualifying conditions of abstractness, indiv-
iduation, and eternality must, by earlier definition, be 
exhibited in the interpretation that seems most accurate. 
When several interpretations fulfill these criteria, it then 
remains to support each competing view by documentation and 
exhaustive interrelation with corollary views. Both of the 
above interpretations fulfill the necessary criteria with 
regard to eternality and abstraction , but only through a 
synthesis of these interpretations is the requirement of 
individuation satisfied. 
The second of these views about negative notions 
expresses the belief that "there are terms negative in form 
but in fact have a positive as well as a negative meaning."Z 
Here Ross believes that because Plato refers to such terms 
as "the Idea of Impiety" and the "Idea of Injustice," ipso 
f acto Plato was committed to believe in the existence of 
such Ideas. Moreover, argued Ross, "such words clearly stand 
1. Ross, PTI, 168. 
2. Ibid. 
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not only for the absence of a quality--since not everything 
that is not just is unjust--but also for the presence or an-
1 
other positive quality." · Were this view to be extended, it 
would in effect seem to commit Plato to the position of say-
ing essentially that the contraries or all the qualities and 
all relations are admissible for membership within the Realm 
of Ideas. Although documentation is not available to support 
this view, such an hypothetical extension again raises' the 
questions: (1) do logical considerations determine the bound-
aries of the ontological system, and (2) how is this view 
affected by the evolving character of Plato's thought? 
The last view mentioned by Ross states that "there 
are terms not negative in form, but definitely suggesting 
the absence of some desireable quality--terms such as 'sick-
ness,' 'evil,' 'ugly. '"2 Whatever else may or may not be 
said about this view, the Ideas which it describes answer t .o 
two of the necessary criteria of qualification. namely, ab-
stractness and individuation. By implication, eternality may 
also be added. Further support for this view may be taken 
from a passage in the dialogues which is definitive and pre-
cise; for in ~Republic Socrates says 
that since beauty and ugliness are opposite, they are 
two things; and consequently each of them is one. The 
same holds of justice and injustice, good and bad, and 
all the essential Forms.' 
1. Roe&, PTI, 168. 
2. Ibid. 
3. Cornford, RP, 183. (Republic 476). 
This passage would leave small doubt as to the recognition 
made by Plato of ~ essential Forms, negative in quality, 
each of which was distinct. Despite this recognition, th~ 
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reader is again faced with a question as to the extent to 
which this treatment may be carried, since the term "esse-nt-
ial" carries some special, but not explicit, meaning which 
would have an important bearing in answering such a question. 
A possible answer to the question of extent and to 
yet a second question which is the complement to it lies 
within the frame of epistemology. This second question aris-
es with respect to what significant meaning, if any, may be 
given to "that which completely is not," namely, anything 
which might be classed as non-being? This question ~resents 
a rather formidable problem t hat may be stated in the follow-
ing way;. 
$lato himself has told us that all knowledge is of, and 
is directed upon, something; that we cannot in fact know 
nothing; that which is not must, therefore, presumably 
have some sort of being, in order thft we may be able 
to speak of it significantly at all. 
The importance of such questioning becomes even more evident 
when trying to conceive of the description Plato might have 
given of such contradictory entities as square circles, or, 
improbable entities, such as ghosts. A solution to this prob-
lem, although a controversial one, for sake of consistency is 
one which derives its force from epistemology, namely, that 
1. Joad, GTP, 281. 
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when Plato talked of the world of non-being, of that 
which completely is not, what he in fact meant was t hat 
which has no discernible qualities or properties, and 1 cannot therefore be an object for the mind's knowledge. 
This view would suggest a kind of existence withput adding 
further predication; in such a case existence would be sheer 
and primitive. And if we are to start somewhere in an ontol-
ogy set in the Platonic framework, the question of thatnes s 
seems more fundamental than that of whatness, in that the 
Ideas are the sine SYA. n2£ of all that is or is not. Although 
such Ideas may spill over from a Parmenidean world into t he 
Heraclitean world of changing things (in a relation that is 
described by Plato as ''manifestation"), such a relation does 
not prejudice their ontological priority from a Platonic 
point of view. 
iii. Ideas of Sensible Objects. 
A third category of Ideas, quite unlike the other two, 
is next met in treating of the populated Realm. The point of 
departure here is more a matter of emphasi~ since the criteria 
of Ideas, gua Ideas, are still met. The unlikeness comes in 
the nature of the sensible objects which participate in the 
Ideas. Here the time-space objects in which the Ideas mani-
fest themselves are of necessity phenomenal, rather than pure-
l y ideational as might be the case with qualities, their rela-
tions, and negative notions; now the subject matter of the 
Idea 1s found only in the world of existent things. In both 
1 . Joad, GTP, 281. 
1'1,} 
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t he Cratylus and ~Republic, for example, Plato refers to 
entities that may by rights be termed "artifacta." These ent-
iti'es draw upon the Ideas for the possibility of their exist-
ence, however fleeting and subject to change. The bed, table, 
auger, and shuttle are specifically recognized.. These certain-
ly do not exhaust the references, nor could they from the stand-
point of consistency; all physical entities must have their 
1 
counterparts among the Ideas which are expressed by class terms. 
In connection with this matter there arises the specu-
lative possibility of creating entities of such complexity, a s 
the UNIVAC for example, that the Realm of Ideas would be strain-
ed to produce a likely counterpart. This is the problem of 
novelty. The problem is a serious one for Plato since, depend-
ing upon interpretation, novel phenomena must be explained 
either by complex Ideas, ,that is, by complex relational char-
acteristics such as UNIVAC, or by simple Ideas, such as redness; 
or yet some, more involved combination of these. 2 In as much 
as it would restrict the explanatory value of the theory of 
1. RiLter, EPP, 159. 
2. Demos, POP, 172. "Every entity enters into a relationship 
with the totality of the forme, accepting some and rejecting 
the rest, except for the categories which accept all the 
forms. The relationship of entities with forms constitut es 
complexes •••• Everything that is real enters into some 
complex or other; and the complexes, in their totality, ex-
haust the real. The terms in a complex are held together 
or separated by the categories. Thus, a complex consists 
(a) of terms, which may be forme alone, or forms and things, 
(b) related together positively or negatively, (c) through 
the intermediation of the categories operating as causes of 
the relatedness." 
I deas to conceive of them as being a limited set of complex 
Ideas , the alternative interpretation regarding simple Ideas 
bears an explanatory value which is superior with respect to 
accounting for novelty. But what is puvchased with novelty 
is pa id for with extensity. For at this point one is led t o 
say that 
whenever two or three data of sense are gathered togeth-
er under a common name, there is a Form present also. 
Hence there must be as many Forms as there are possibil-
ities of grouping t~ings under headings and applying to 
them a common term. 
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On the one hand, any attempt to circumscribe membership of sim-
ple Ideas would seem to fail; but, on the other hand, there is 
no conclusive evidence in Flato's writings as to where, if a t 
all, boundaries should be set. It remained for the 20th c ent tl-
ry r ealists to remove all boundaries. 
3. l:.!J&Helation Q.t. Uniyersale p .tQ. Farticulars. 
Corollary to the subject of simple Ideas is t he vital 
question as to how such Ideas enter into relation with space-
time objects. The question is one of the most difficult for 
Flato, since to say that the Ideas are abstract, eternal, and 
changeless seems to preclude their presence in space-time ob-
jects which are patently characterized by concreteness, tran-
sitivity, and mutation. The relation, if there were one, would 
seem to be that of mutual exclusiveness. This, however, is 
not so . The explanation which Flato in fact gives seems to 
1. Fuller, HF, I, 131. 
• 
be aimed at an ambivalence in that the "forms are immanent 
1 " 
in things and also transcend the.m," the latter being a mat-
ter of definition since the Ideas are characterized by their 
2 transcendence. On the other hand, "the doctrine of the 1m-
manence of the forme is hard to reconcile with the doctrine 
of the absoluteness of the forms," 3 since this violates the 
terms of the definition of the Idea. 
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To explain the doctrine of immanence several accounts 
have been offered. Foremost among these, both in publicity 
and in importance, is the theory of participation. This 
theory may be stated in either of two ways: first, "that in-
dividual things but partake of the universal essence of the 
4 Idea;" second, t he Ideas manifest themselves in the partie -
S ulars. Critics Gf ten seek to explain this theory to be one 
of causal connection, suggesting that the Ideas are formal 
causes of the essence of things, 6· which is to say that "the 
sensible world owes its being to the presence in it of the 
7 Forms." 
Besides the causal theory, two major attempts by 
Plato to explain participation are outstanding. The firs t 
of these occurs in ~ Republic when a somewhat metaphoric al 
1. Demos, POP, 182. 
2. Th!9:.·' 21. 
3. Th!9:.·' 184. 
4. Windelband, HP, 120. 
s. Taylor, PI, 35. 
6. Ritter, EPP, 157. 
7. Joad , GTP, 279. 
description is given of the way in which the particular 
partakes of the universal. In hie discussion of the Div-
ided Line Socrates suggests that actual things have a rela-
tion to their Form-counterpart which is of the same sort 
that the shadows on the walls, and the images in the water, 
have with their actual visible 1 figures. This relationship 
may be described as "reflection," "representation," or 
nsubstitutivity." But in each case the relationship is 
only partly descriptive in the same way that any analogy 
only suggests and never defines. Nor can the analogies be 
pressed, since the figures of speech that would result 
would be of a phenomenal or physical-istic nature, and thus 
fail at the very point at which an ontological rather than 
an epistemic explanation was needed. Hence, the problem is 
not met with satisfaction; namely, to describe adequately, 
or define, the mediate relation between the Idea and the 
particular. 
In the Parmenidee a more extended treatment of par-
2 ticipation is offered; however, in the actual attempt at 
clarification there is a further lapse into analogy. This 
time Socrates is saying: 
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In my opinion, the ideas are, as it were, patterns fix -
ed in nature, and other things are like them, and re-
semblances of them- -what is meant by the participation 
of other3things in the ideas, is really assimilation to them. 
1. Cornford, RP, 224-225 (Republic 509, 510). 
2 . Joviett, DOP, rf, 52 (Parmenidee 132). 
3 . ~. 
.l\ 
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Here again the relationship between the universal and the par-
ticular, described as npatterning," implies a copy or imita-
tion, but does not account for the actual linking process. 
The problem then is to state clearly just exactly how any or 
all beds, for example, participate in the Idea of Badness, or 
how the beds are patterned by Badness--at the ontologie level •. 
To attempt an answer to this by way of epistemology exclus ive-
ly would beg the original question. Sponsored in part by 
this dilemma, the debate which has ranged through the cent-
uries has·; paradoxically, like the whirlwind, a lacuna at its 
center. The problem is real enough; but it is questionable 
whether Plato's answers, if they may be so called, did much 
more than create the atorm. 1 
4. Plato 1 a Ontology. 
In his description of the Ideas, there arises the 
question as to which of the several types of being Plato 
used as a jumping off point. And although it is clear that 
Plato granted precedence to the Ideas, there is much in fa-
vor of the view that his method was empirical. 2 The moa t 
forceful reason for saying this is that of all the Ideas 
mentioned in the dialogues, none can be found which do not 
1. Ritter, EPP, 226~ "How this participation or this being 
affected is to be understood, what the relation of the 
Idea to the sensible objects or to the content of the i-
deation process is, remains inexplicable for Plato, i. e. , 
he does not know how to substantiate it any further, nor 
how to deduce it from anything else." 
2 . Demos, POP, 18. 
/ 
somehow have a counterpart "in the given, from the actual 
world, from 'this which is ~alled the universe. '" 1 This is 
at once a critical point in Platonic procedure since the de-
scription of the Ideas comes to depend largely upon percep-
tual acquaintance. The dynamic aspect of this procedure i s 
even more challenging because after perceptual acquaintance 
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has functioned to illustrate the nature of a transitory and 
mutable reality, this acquaintance then serves as the basis 
for a description of the persistent characteristics or things, 
that is~ the Ideas. 
Granting, for sake of argument, this empirical pro-
cedure in conceiving of the Ideas to correspond in some sense 
to the particulars or their exemplifications, the next step 
is to justify what has been conceived. Further evidence for 
the empirical nature of Plato's method is seen by way of the 
proofs, so called, for the transcendence of the Ideas i n that 
such proofs are epistemological in nature. The allegory of 
the cave is typical. The function of "verification" of the 
Ideas proceeds all too often from analogy, and aside from cer-
tain mystical indulgences2 remain centered about the Realm of 
Particulars. Thus a two-way empirical method is em~loyed: the 
first is in his initial description in that Plato adduces t he 
Ideas from what may be called their empirical or existential 
counterparts; second, in support of the Ideas he argues for 
1. Demos, POP, 18. 
2 . Such as in the Meno _with reference to the theory of the soul. 
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their ontological priority by using examples from empiricism. 
"In this it becomes evident how closely logic for him is 
bound up in ontology and epistemology." 1 
But the logico-metaphysical interest which Plato grafted 
upon the Socratic doctrine of knowledge carried him far 
beyond the master as regards the content of this doc-
trine. The general characteristics which he developed 
for the essence of the Ideas applied to all class-£QU-
cepts_, and the immaterial world was therefore peopl·ed 
with the archetypes of the entire world of experience • 
••• In so far criticism was right in saying that Pla-
to's world of Ideas was t~e world of perception thought 
over again in conception. 
A final general statement concerning Plato's ontol-
ogy must be considered. Although the Ideas maintain an un-
disputed precedence in Plato's ontology, such a precedence 
is seen in relation to the phenomenal world. Yet ultimate 
priority must be given to another ontologie level, namely, 
that of Being, qua Being. This may be seen since all the 
Ideas have or share Being. Plato argued that since 
being is an attribute of the forms, it is something 
other than they. The forms are exemplifications of 
being--in fact, its completest exemplifications; but 
they are not being itself. Now since the notion of 
being is prior to that of the forms, Plato's philos-
ophy cannot be summed up in the theory of the forms. 
The realm of the forms occupies a subordinate position 
in the metaphysical situation, and is a derivative 
of being •••• In studying the forme we are concern-
ing ourselves with the real but not with the ultimate. 
Being is beyond any one of its exemplifications; 
therefore any doctrine which defines being in terms 
of spe~ific being, be it process or form, is inade-
quate. 
1. Ritter, EPP, 253. 
2. Windelband, HP, 121. 
3. Demos, POP, 135-136; Jowett, DOP, IV, 246 (Theaetetus 
186), "Being or essence ••• of all our notions is the 
most universal." For a discussion of universal classes 
see also: Jowett, DOP, IV, 386 (Sophist 253). 
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Then for sake of gaining a cross-section picture of the Realm, 
it is to be seen that there are three primary levels of exist-
ence implicit in Plato's ontology: Being as such, Ideas or 
Forms, and phenomena. To omit any one of these in a descrip-
tion of Plato's view would do violence to his ontology. This 
is particularly so since Plato's arguments in defense of one 
ontologie level cut across, and draw support from, the other 
two levels. Thus to see the broad scope of Plato's position 
the acceptance of each of the above levels is vital. To gain 
recognition of the dimensions circumscribed by the Realm of 
Ideas as part of the total ontologie picture, both Being and 
phenomena must share the mutual relation as major complements 
of the Ideas. Taken collective, Being, The Ideas, and phen-
omena exhaust the content of the Platonic universe. 1 
1. Strictly speaking, the demiurge constitutes a separate 
category distinct from any of these three. The demiurge 
served a cosmological function (a world-forming god), one 
'\IJ'hich ordered the chaotic universe under the telic guide 
r f the Ideas. 
CHAPTm III. . 
NEO-REALISM 
1. The c Realistic .Polemic~ 
The American Nee-Realistic movement that emerged in 
1912 with the publication of a co- operative volume entitled 
The New Realism, had its genesis as a reaction both to Josi-
ah Royce's idealism and to the subjectivism that had pene-
trat ed so deeply into philosophic thought since the time of 
Locke.] As a reaction the early phase of Neo-Realism was 
polemical, 2 seeking to show the weaknesse~ of Roycean ideal-
ism and of subjectivism rather than present any positive pro-
gram of its own. Since most of the six Neo-Realists3 who 
comprised . this movement had been at one time under the tu-
t e l age of William James, the tenor of their argument often 
followed the same pattern as that which James voiced in the 
now- famous debates that took place between himself and Royc e . 
Indeed, the Nee-Realistic movement has been spoken of as the 
god- child of James's radical empiricism, 4 since the Nee-
Realists applauded James's attack on Royce's views. 
The dissatisfactions the Nee-Realists found with 
idealisms generally concerned the epistemological aspect 
"according to which the world in which we live is conceived 
1. Wer kmeister, PIA, 372. 
2. Holt et ll•, NR, 11. 
3. Edwin B. Holt, Walter T. Marvin, William B. Montague, 
Ralph B. Perry, Walter P, Pitkin, and Edward G. Spaulding . 
4. Werkmeister, PIA, 371. 
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as a product fashioned by consciousness from the raw mater-
ials of its own states." 1 One result of such dissatisfaction 
was to commit the Nee-Realists to defend a positive view in 
contradistinction to those which they attacked. From this 
early defense such a view soon appeared in an article enti-
tled "The Program and First Platform of the New Realists,"2 
published in 1910, in which was set forth a definitive out-
line of the new movement. But the reactionary character of 
the movement which began as an attack upon Roycean idealism 
continued as a polemic until the Nee-Realistic position came 
to appear most clearly "in its relations with 'na!ve realism,' 
'dualism, 1 and 1 subjectivism. 1 "3 It was the express purpose 
of the six realists not only to criticize these doctrines, 
but, moreover, "to profit by the errors as well as the discov-
eries for which the doctrines have been responsible." 4 
Their main objection to na1ve realism, the Neo-
Res"lists urged, was that this doctrine made nno distinction 
between seeming and being; things ~ just what they seem,n 5 
that is, the world outside the mind, or consciousness, is 
thought of just as it appears to be. Such a theory was 
called a "searchlight" theory since "consciousness ie thought 
of as analogous to a light which shines out through the 
1. Montague, Art.(l912), 251. 
2. Printed in Jour. fl!ll..~ 7(1910), 393-40.1. 
3 • Ho 1 t e t !!.!· , NR ~ 2 • 
4. Ibid. . 
5. !bid. 
s ense organs, illuminating the world outside the knower." 1 
According to such a theory, the Nee-Realists argued, "there 
2 
was no such thing as error,n as in the case of the seemi ng-
ly bent stick partially immersed in water, or the seemingly 
convergent railroad tracks. In short, na1ve realism f a iled 
to account for aberrations in perception because that which 
is perceived depends 
not only upon the nature of the object, but on the 
medium through which its energies have passed on t heir 
way to our organism; and al~o upon the condition of 
our sense organs and brain.j 
The objection to this second doctrine, namely to dualism, 
"which is exemplified in the philosophies of Descartes and 
Locke, LWas thai!the mind never perceives anything external 
to itself. It perceives only its own ideas or states." 4 
This theory of perception the Nee-Realists called the 11 pic -
turen theory since consciousness may be thought of nas a 
painter's canvas or a photographic plate on which objects 
in themselves imperceptible are represented. 115 However well 
such a theory may account for error and illusion, said the 
Nee-Realists, it ttappears to account for nothing elee." 6 
The real object was forever lost to discovery. 
Finally, the doctrines of subjectivists like Berk-
eley came under violent attack since they, according to t he 
1. Holt et g. , NR, 2. 
2. Ibid. 
3. Ibid., 4. 
4. Ibid. 
5. Ibid. 
6. Ibid.' 5. 
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Nee-Realists' account, sought to maintain that "there can 
be no object without a subject, no existence without a con-
sciousness of it."1 The Neo-Rea1ists 1eveled their heaviest 
verbal artil1ery on the Berkeleian form of subjectivism, 
charging that Berkeley refused to recognize 
{1) that the relations between ideas or the order in 
which they are given us, and (2) the other minds that 
are known, are quite as relative to the knower as are 
the pr~mary and secondary qualities for the physical 
world. · 
Furthermore, Berkeley's intuitional argument {~ est percipi) 
commits what the Neo-Realists call the fallacy of psycho-
physical metonomy; a charge that took essentially the same 
form as G.E. Moore's.3 The intuitional argument has two 
forma: 
The upshot of Berkeley's position, the Neo-Realists point 
out, commits him to either a solipsism or a complete rela-
tiviam.5 This is to say, subjectivism holds that either 
the individual and his ideas are the only existing enti-
1. Holt et §1_. , NR, 5. 
2 . Ibid., 6. 
3. Moore's article first appeared in~' 12(1903), 433 -453 . 
4. Montague, Art.(l910), 396. 
5. Holt et al, NR, 7. 
ties in the universe; or, that knowledge is completely 
relative to the knOwing mind, and varies from one indiv-
idual to another. Both alternatives are immediately re-
jected by the Nee-Realists as being either unintelligible 
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or fruitless. Thus an escape from subjectivism on the one 
hand, and on the other hand "the formation of an alternative 
that shall be both remedial and positively fruitful, con-
stitutes the central preeminent issue for any realistic 
protagonist." 1 
2. 1lllt Realistic Thesis · • 
. "The grounds upon which realism rejects subjectiv-
ism determines to some extent the superstructure which is 
2 to be reared in its place. 11 And with respect to the con-
etructive side of the Nee-Realistic thesis, the theory of 
cognition is fundamental. In a theory of cognition, how-
ever, "if there is going to be knowledge, there must be 
something there to be known, and something there to know; 
'there' meaning the field in which the relatione obtain. 11 3 
The knower and the known cannot be analyzed separately; 
"they must be brought into one field of study, and observed 
in their mutual transactions. 114 But this is not to say 
that the transaction determines the nature of the known, 
1. Holt et al., NR, 10. 
2. Ibid., 31. 
3. Ibid., 34. 
4. Ibid. 
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rather, the Neo-Realist "believes that he thus discovers t hat 
the interaction in question is not responsible for the char -
acters of the thing known." 1 Two reasons can be given for 
this: f.irst, "being known" implies a pre-existing something 
to be known; second, the knower and the known are for the 
most part undisturbed when knowing takes place. 2 This de-
scription of the knowing relation refers to the theory of 
indenendence, a primary doctrine in the Neo-Realistic the-
sis. More precisely, this theory means that the entities 
existing in the so called external world are independent 
of, not to be correlated with, unaffected by, and are free 
from influence by the knower when the knowing relation takes 
place. "The being and the nature of these entities are in 
3 
no sense conditioned by their being known." 
A second tenet essential to a constructive Neo-
Realistic thesis is that all knowledge ~ ~resentative ~ 
4 direct. This is the doctrine called epistemological mon-
ism, asserting that 
experience is a single phenomenon, possessing the neu-
trality of being interpretable either from the stand-
point of mind or matter. Matter is not regarded as 
more fundamental than mind, nor is mind, on the other 
hand, considered prior to matter. In stuff experience 
is neither physical nor mental. It s character as mat-
erial or psychical depends not upon its inherent nature, 
but upon the relations ~hich it bears to the contexts 
of experience at large.~ 
1. Holt et al., NR, 34. 
2 . Ibid. 
3. Holt, Art.(l910), 394. 
L{ . • Holt et al., NR, 35. 
5 . Evans, NROR, 117. 
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At the onset this thesis rejects the dualistic notion that 
the mind and its object are numerically distinct in the act 
of knowing. When consciousness is had of things, these= "be-
l 
come themselves the content of consciousness." This is to 
say, "that which lies before the mind when knowledge takes 
place, is numerically identical with the thing known. 112 
This doctrine is quite compatible with a theory of independ--
ence, since according to such a theory the mind may or may 
not mediate knowledge of the thing itself; but since it is 
the case that knowledge is not mediated, the Neo-Realists 
contend, then in the cognitive relationship the independent 
entity which becomes known in consciousness is in fact part 
of the perceiver's consciousness in a one-to-one relation. 
This explanation, the Nee-Realists believe, best describes 
the relational aspect of the known. 
The third feature of the Neo-Realistic thesis is one 
vitally related to the other two. This is that "the world 
is of an articulate structure ••• consisting of complexes, 
like bodies, persons and societies, as well as simples."3 
These simples are the constituents of the world that take 
the form of sensible qualities and of logical constants. 
4 
"Both enter into the tissue of fact." The Neo-Realist, 
however, gives recognition to 
1. Holt et ~., NR, 35. 
2. Ibid., 34 (italics mine). 
3 • Ibid • , 3 5 • 
4. Ibid. 
not only concrete, particular entities, that is, 
existents, but also abstract entities, known as 
subsistents, f[hai! are objective to and indepen-
dent of the knowing mind for their being. 
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"Existents" denote actual objects such as chairs and tables; 
"we can say that the real universe consists of the space-time 
system of existents, together with all that is presupposed by 
2 that system." That which is presupposed by such a system 
is yet another system of subsistent entities which make up an 
" absolute summum genus. "3 The term "subsistent" denotes here 
"any one of the actual and possible ob.lects of thought." 4 The 
notion of the subsistent is much broader than the theory of 
Ideas of which Plato spoke, although both share the qualit ies 
of abstractness, eternality, and individuation. The Nee-
Realist carries the notion of possibility to its logical ex-
treme to include all possible subsistents. The recognit ion 
of such manifold entities took the Neo-Realiste beyond the 
orbit of epistemological considerations alone, committing 
them to an ontology which may be called pluralistic. Such 
a theory of ontology explained most completely the inalien-
able character of the relations that obtain in the world's 
articulate structure and had, the Nee-Realists felt, the full 
support of a logic of relations, if not modern science. 
The fourth outstanding element of the Nee-Realist 
1. Evans, NROR, 73. 
2. Montague, Art.(l912), 255. 
3. Ibid.' 253. 
4. Ibid. 
position was the method by which they sought to explain the 
rapport which takes place among such relationships implied 
by a theory of subsistents. This was the method of logical 
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1 
analysis. This means the carefu~ "systematic and exhaustive 
2 
examination of any topic of discourse." The actual subjec t 
matter of analysis is the totality of manifold entities and 
relations that exist in the world of things and subsist in 
the world of thought. 3 In using the method of analysis it 
is a necessary condition that the entities and relations are 
in no way changed in terms of their structure or components. 
However, it may be shown by1 this method that such entities 
and relations are often 
unanalyzable or that they may be further reduced. If 
they turn out to be unanalyzable, it can only be because 
they exhibit no complexity or structure, no plurality 
of necessary factors. If they turn out to be reducible , 
then they m~st be identical with the totality of their 
components. 
The major job of the analyst is to understand the arrangement 
of the parts in any complex structure, not, it may be added, 
to attempt to substitute a collection of parts. 5 The further-
ance of the analytic method is best achieved in two ways: first, 
by a scrupulous use of words, since in philosophy such a use 
6 is the surest proof of a sensitive scientific conscience; 
1. Holt et ~, NR, 35. 
2. Ibid.' 24. 
3. Spaulding, Art.(l912), 161. 
4. Holt et al., NR, 24. 
5 • Ibid • ' 2 5 • 
6 • Ibid • , 21. 
1 
and second, by a regard for logical form. But in keeping 
with the theory of independence, 
the logical categories of unity, such as homogeneity, 
consistency, coherence, interrelation, etc., do not i n 
any case imply a determinate degree of unity. Hence 
the degree of unity which the world possesses cannot 
be determined logically, but only by assembli~g the 
results of the special branches of knowledge. 
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From this it will be seen that the whole-part and part-whole 
relationships involving analysis subsume the view that enti-
ties . are "·in some sense formed or composed of parts, n3 and 
that a special view concerning the nature of these relations 
is intrinsically necessary toan .analysis based upon the Neo-
Realistic contentions. 
"An entity possessing some relations independently 
of another; and the ignorance or discovery of further rela-
4 tiona does not invalidate a limited knowledge of relations. " 
This doctrine, the fifth in the Neo-Realist's thesis, implies 
an external view of relations, asserting 
(1) that both a term and a relation are (unchangeable) 
elements or entities; (2) that a term may stand in one 
or in many r elations to one or many other terms; and 
(3) that any of these terms and that some of these rel-
ations could be absent .or that other ter~s and relations 
could pe present without there being any resulting mod~ 
ificat~on., etc., of5the remaining or already present terms or relations. 
The relations that the Neo-Realist endeavors to examine in 
cognition have an objectivity that is just the same as any 
1. Holt et al., NR, 25. , 
2. Perry--, Art.(l910), 398 . 
3. Spaulding, Art. (J912), 156. 
4 . Perry, Art. ( 1910), 398. · 
5 . Spaulding, Art.(l910), 400. 
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other investigation would discover them to be. As in the 
case of the sciences, "the relation between things and be-
tween the properties of things are not only noticed but be -
2 
come the chief and even the sole subject matter." Through-
out their discussion of the nature of cognition, the Nee-
Realists emphasized not only the existent and subsistent 
entities in the universe, but also "the relations between 
them, which are as truly parts of the entity analysed- as 
are the elementary terms."3 If any essential aspects of 
such relations are ignored by analysis, the result would be 
4 
a falsification which the Nee-Realist is committed to re-
ject by virtue of his stated aim to examine exhaustively 
any topic of discourse. 
Each aspect of Nee-Realism discussed thus far, both 
polemical and constructive, is ingrained within the Nee-
Realist's theory of perception to be discussed next. It i s 
from this discussion that the Nee-Realistic ontological pre-
suppositions will become even more evident. 
3. ~Nee-Realist's Presentative .. Theory .of Perception. 
It has been stated already that the Nee-Realists 
hold to an epistemological monism. Yet, the place of ob-
ject and of consciousness, together with the relations be-
tween them, are featured quite uniquely in this application 
1. Holt et 1!:1.•, NR, 24. 
2. Marvin, FBM, 175. 
3 • Ibid • , 8 3 • 
4 . Ibid. 
o~ this perceptual theory, and each needs to be enlarged,:, 
upon to make the import of this vital aspect · of Neo-Real-
ism fully explicit. First, however, a few general com-
ments about the nature of knowledge as it is conceived 
by the Neo-Realist are necessary. The Neo-Realists hold 
to the doctrine that "epistemology does not give but pre-
1 
supposes, a theory of reality. 11 This reality is a plural-
istic universe composed of Being, which in turn incorporates 
a duality of realms, one of existents as mentioned above, 
and a second, of subsistents. The Neo-Realists treat of 
the realm of subsistents as identical to that of the all-
inclusive universe of logical and conceptual entities. It 
is such a universe that 
is composed of neutral, conceptual entities, of terms 
and propositions. All its component parts as well as 
the wholes composed are objective, having their own 
bein& and being open to the gaze of all. Real and un-
real, matter and mind, sensation and perception, mem-
ory, imagination, thought, volitions and unity of con-
sciousness, as well as illusions, hallucinations, 
dream~, fancies, error and contradictions, all are 
such. 
Such a theory supposes a kind of objectivity for all objects 
of thought, both actual and possible, even to include its 
own theory, that is, itself, as objective. This kind of 
objectivity implies that any object of perception becomes 
a logical analogue with respect to the state of conscious-
ness that perceives it. 
1. Marvin, Art.(l912), 75. 
2. Hasan, Rea .• , 178. 
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i. The Relational Theory of Consciousness. 
The Nee-Realistic theory of consciousness in effect 
eliminates the existence of mind, at least to the degre& 
that whatever function the mind might otherwise have, this 
function is identified with consciousness. 1 Although mak-
ing such an identification, this theory does not go on to 
identify the locus of consciousness as being fixed, as when 
it is said that the location of mind is in the brain. To 
the contrary, the Nee-Realist seeks to show that conscious-
ness is "out there" where the objects exist in the so-called 
external world. What consciousness has of this external 
world is that which makes up the content of the organism' s 
experience. This content is then described as the "cross 
2 
section" of being; this is to say, the existent entities 
of the spatio-temporal world enter into a certain noetic 
relation with the organism's consciousness,so that when 
sensation takes place the entities which are sensed become: 
themselves a part of consciousness. The "cross section" 
which consciousness has of these entities is, in point of 
fact, of absolute and numerical identity, a complete corre-
spondence. When the Nee-Realist has a consciousness, say , 
of the color blue ~ sensation, .the quality blue that be -
comes a part of the organism's consciousness simply is. 
To this extent, blue is both neutral and simple; it is 
1. Evans, NROR, 121. 
2 • Holt, CC , 182. 
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neutral because in its correspondence with the logico-sub-
sistent object there is both qualitative and numerical iden-
tity; it is a simple because blue, gua blue, is not analyz-
able into further components or into more simple entities. 
Blue in this instance, that is as an existent entity in 
sensation, is an existent primitive about which the thatness 
is an ultimate category. 
In the case of conception the Nee-Realist's explan-
ation of consciousness is a somewhat more involved recapit -
ulation of the same principles that were seen to apply in 
sensation.. That is, with respect to conceptual entities t h e 
notion of the object is retained so that when the Neo-Real-
1st may speak about objects of memory, or of reflection, or 
of imagination, he does so with much the same meaning he 
ascribed in speaking of sensed objects. However, when enter-
ing into such relations, the consciousness had of these con-
ceptual objects, whether they are genuine objects or not, 
u sually consists of complexes of entities rather than sim-
ples as in the case of the sensation blue. "Consciousness 
does not confer existence upon its real objects and still 
1 less does it confer existence upon its unreal objects." 
The conceptual object, whether this be a memory of the red-
ness in the apple seen on a previous day, or whether 1 t 'i s 
a reflection upon the value of redness in a certain aesthet-
ic object, or whether redness is imaginatively conceived~ of 
1. Montague, Art.(l914), 49. 
I 
'1 
as a symbol for certain experiences--all such conceptual ob-
jects have a counterpart in the all-inclusive Realm of Possi -
bility, even though momentarily subsisting in the organism' s 
consciousness at the mom ent of awareness. This is to say, 
the conceptual object discovered in consciousness and the 
logico-ontological objec t that eternally subsists are one 
and the same in every respect. 
Consciousness, then, is thought of by the Nee-Real-
ist as "the potential or implicative presence of a thing at 
1 
a space or time in which that thing is not present." The 
thing or object becomes a part of the organism's conscious-
ness in actuality through the interaction of consciousness 
and the object when both are present at a common space-time 
co- ordinate. At such a co-ordinate "consciousness selects 
Lite objecif from a field of entities which it does not cre-
ate,112 and to this degree consciousness is an active agent, 3 
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rather than a passive mold upon which impressions are stamp-
ed. The only modification with which consciousness endows 
its perceived enti t ies is that such entities acquire a func -
tion as content at the moment when the organism's perception 
4 
takes place. It is in this way that consciousness becomes 
a relating factor which unites the living organism and tha 
universe; and, in its dependence upon the living organism, 
1. Montague, Art.(l912), 281. 
2. Perry, Art.(l910), 397. 
3. Perry, Art.(l912), 139. 
4. Ibid. 
consciousness' 
is the sum total of all the neutral entities to which 
the living organism responds, and it is the system of 
these entities in just such and such quantity and just 
such spatial and temporal arrangement as fhe environ-
ment and the responses thems.elves define. 
ii. The Neutral Mosaic. 
"If consciousness is a relation, objects of con-
scioueness must be real independently of their standing i n 
2 that relation. 11 The nature of such objects or entities, 
according to the Neo-Realist, is neutral in that these ob -
jects or entities are the non-reducible simples of exper-
ience. They cannot 
be explained in terms of physical or psychical things . 
Ih fact, they are indefinable. Definition demands a 
predication, ascription of attributes. The only qual-
ity which neutral entities possess is the one which 
even analysis cannot di,esipe,te, namely, being, pure 
being, or mere is-ness.) 
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In sensation the entity blue simply is, and cannot be further 
reduced; in conception the complex structure of the entities 
may be analysed into their simples, but once thi.s state is 
reached all that can be said of them is that they in fact 
are. Because of this indefinable aspect, the is-ness or the 
thatness _must suffice as being the unassailable character of 
such entities. 
In matters of the organisms affective experiences as 
1. Holt, CC, 184. 
2. Montague, Art.(l905), 313. 
3. Evans, NR OR , 97. 
emotions, pleasures, pain, and the like, "in eo far as we 
1 
know about them at all they are in the same way neutral;" 
in theory and practice these phenomena 11 are as amenable to 
communication and logical handling as are the concepts of 
n2 acceleration and "71 • The atomistic pluralism which is 
being asserted here is not limited merely to the neutral 
entities which its diverse forms of mind and matter may 
take, but also to those 
neutral entities [thail are marvelously compacted in 
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a united system such that the simple develop without 
break or discontinuity into the more and more complex, 
even down to the infinite diversity of concrete being.3 
The logical character of such a pluralistic ontology estab-
lishes the priority of metaphysics over epistemology which, 
if accepted, provides the Nee-Realists with the ready-made 
stuff for vrhich their theory of perception need only to 
account in terms of a relational view of consciousness. 
Moreover, the Nee-Realists would argue, their theory of on-
tology is in keeping with the latest developments of mathe-
matics and the natural sciencee. 4 Both in the Nee-Realist' s 
method and in the scientific method the 
object is viewed under the category of Relation. This 
method of correlating every phenomenon with a condi-
tioning relation subsisting between other phenomena 
enables us to pass from one part of reality to another, 
and to bring all discrete objects into the substitu-
tional continuum of knowledge.5 
1. Holt, CC, 111. 
2. Ibid. 
3. Ibid.' 164. 
4. Marvin, Art.(l912), 83-86. 
5. Montague, Art.(l905), 309-310. 
I ndeed, say the Neo-Realists, this universe is an infinite 
1 
mosaic of being, one which is 
neither subjective nor objective in substance, but is 
neutral, that it is ordered, that it develops unceas-
ingly of its own motion, and that as our knowledge ad-
vances we have more an~ more reason to believe that 
its unity is complete. 
iii. Perception. 
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Perception for the Nee-Realist is in many ways anal o-
gous to the na!ve realist's "searchlight theory" of percep-
tion. In point of fact the perceptual act is referred to 
as the umariner's searchlight which is the nervous system, 
and the totality of objects that are illuminated is the 
cross-section, or consciousness."3 The cross-section is t hat 
part of the organism's environment with which he is brought 
into contact in perception, and since this contact is direct 
so it is that the environment is presented immediately to 
the organism's consciousness. What the cross-section is in 
consciousness is the content of knowledge; the act of acquir-
ing this content, that is, bringing the consciousness into 
a certain relation with the environment, is the act of per-
caption. 
A distinction is to be made at this point between 
sensation, conception, and perception, one which involves 
the notion of complexity in terms of the structure of each. 
1. Holt; CC, 164. 
2. Ibid.' 165. 
3 . Ibid., 209. 
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In both sensation and conception there presides a factor of 
simplicity that permits the entry into consciousness of qual-
ities called "simples" which have a character that is not in 
1 
the least complex. The sensation of the color blue, ~ blue, 
is a case in point;2 the conception of a sinking ship, ~ 
3 
sinking ship, is also a case in point. These entities are 
simples just "so long as the mass of qualities that enter to-
gether has within itself little or no logical structure or 
4 
unity, no internal relationship." Perception, on the other 
hand, is distinguished by the fact that both sensations and 
conceptions as we ordinarily experience them enter into the 
perceptual act in complexes or highly structured groups. A 
second distinction is that "in perception the groupe have 
some logical coherence; 115 there is no precise dividing line 
where sensation ends and perception begins. When there is 
an occurrence of sensation in consciousness, not only eo 
these pass in and out of consciousness, but 
while there they are said to change; a red colour is 
said to turn yellow, a small object to grow larger. 
But since red is not yellow, it is scarcely true o~ 
the red that it becomes yellow. We speak of it as 
changing because the qualities that successively su-
persede one another, generally in a given position, 
are similar to the next. Now similarity is partial 
identity, and hence the successive colours have some-
thing in common as well as something of difference. 
Therefore the red that seemgd to be a simple quality 
is not simple but compound. 
1. Holt, CC, 209. 
2. Ibid., 212-213. 
3. Ibid., 81. 
4. Ibid., 210. 
5. Ibid. 
6. Ibid., 212. 
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This phenomenon of change which takes place in sensation 
accounts in part for the diversity which introspection often 
finds difficult to explain; this is to say, the fact that 
sensations are subject to change, 
one quality seeming to become another that resembles 
it, points to a variety of parts within the quality 
that to introspection seem simple; these simpler part s 
not resembling one another but being combined in vary-
ing propositions, and the parts or psychic atoms them-
selves, eo far as we know, not changing. 
In the final analysis, all sensations and perceptions are 
reducible to these simples, which are expressible in some-
thing akin to the scientific terminology that describes the 
behavior of atoms. Even the most complexly structured con-
tents of consciousness such as those of space and time are 
ultimately reducible, since "only the space and time in 
which we can locate the causes of our perceiving is the 
space and time revealed in perception. 112 
Summarizing, then, the world of objects which the 
Neo-Realist perceives, he does so directly.3 Yet, there is 
no correspondence here between these objects and the per-
ceiver's consciousness. In fact 
there are not sensations or perceptions ~ their ob-
jects. There are objects, and when these are included 
in the manifold called consciousness they are called 
sensations and perceptions •••• Sensations and percep-
tions are objects in the hierarchy of being, and they 
are in the psychic cross-section w~en the nervous sys -
tem specifically responds to them. 
1. Holt, CC, 218. 
2. Montague, Art.(l914), 61. 
3. Ibid.' 49. 
4. Holt, CC, 219. 
The objects of the real world that are quantitatively and 
qualitatively enveloped when perception takes place are 
not by necessity real or actual, rather, such a world is 
a virtual or potential reprojection of the effects 
which the world pro1ects upon us. And just as the 
virtual images that appear behind the mirror may be 
(but need not be) identical in quality and position 
with the objects that ca.use them, so the objects we 
perceive may be (but need not be) exactly identical 1 
with the existing objects that cause our perceptions. 
This theory, in effect, asserts the identity of indiscern-
2 ibles, maintaining that in and through the act of percep-
tion objects and consciousness are qualitatively neutral 
and numerically identical. Here the Nee-Realists finally 
arrive at the position of asserting that the atomic plural-
ities of the world acquire, when occurring in perception, a 
monistic character. 
4. Metaphysical Priority~ 
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The Nee-Realist's argument for the knowability of 
an object both presupposes and hinges upon the ultimate sub-
sistence of that object.3 To support this point of view the 
Nee-Realists developed an ontology that made knowledge possi-
ble by first positing a Realm of Possibility which at once 
included in it all the possibles that in any way may become 
known, or for that matter, may even remain unknown. This is 
to say, the Realm of Possibility is all-inclusive, embracing 
1. Montague, Art.(1914), 62. 
2. Hasan, Rea., 190. 
3. Marvin, Art.(l912), 74. 
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within its scope all possible objects of thought. The ob-
jects of thought include not only such things as dreams, 
imaginings, reflections, memories, and the like, but objects 
of pure thought as well. All possible logical propositions, 
together with both their contradictions and their contrar-
ies, in part make up these objects of pure thought. Logical 
relations also compose this class of objects since nall rel-
ations presuppose the existence of terms between which they 
1 
subsist.n In brief', the Neo-Realists acclaim 
a general universe of being in which all things physic al, 
mental, and logical , propositions and terms, existent and 
non-existent, f~lse and true, good and evil, real and 
unreal subsist. 
"'All that is oblect is,' and is independent of mind; and 
'Nothing is that is not oblect. rn3 
The elaborate character of this ontology was such t hat 
it guaranteed being to everything, and, in the strictest sense, 
even to the possibility of its own falsehood, since the pos s i-
bility of all propositions, their terms and relations, has 
been admitted • . From the preeminence of this logical basis, 
one may describe the conceptual character of the Neo-Realis t 's 
universe as an all-pervasive and highly penetrating logical 
atomism. These logical atoms, aside from their pure being, 
enjoy a freedom assured to them under the doctrine of inde• 
pendence; they further enjoy a neutrality that involves fix -
1. Montague, Art.(l905), 313. 
2. Hasan, Rea., 165. 
3. Ibid. 
i ty and objectivity rather than a subjective feature; each 
atom remains "what it is in and out of relation to any 
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other entity, be it an apprehending mind or anything else.111 
Summarily, the Realm of Possibility exhausts the content of 
the universe of being. 
The subsistent character of the logical atom, as 
well as those of conceptual and material entities, bring 
to bear all the features mentioned earlier as they relate 
to the Nee-Realist's doctrine of possibility. The presup-
position of such a Realm of Possibility has the force, if 
accepted, to make the Nee-Realist's conclusions in epist-
emology completely tenable. It remains merely to be said 
that the Nee-Realist's epistemological argument rests en-
tirely upon the truth or falsity of their ontological com-
mitment, which in effect is the 
identification of being with subsistence, i.e. with 
the mode of being of concepts or universals; and on 
the identification of concepts with the abstract ele-
ments of existence, i.e. with what has the mode of 
being of percepts or particulars. That being and 
subsistence are regarded as identical is shown by the 
fact that no difference is made between them, and the 
universe of being is freely spoken of as the universe 
of 11 logicaln or conceptual entities.2 
Any criticism of Nee-Realism with respect to its general 
theory of ontology, and particularly with respect to its 
thesis concerning the objectivity of error, may best begin 
with an examination of this identification in order to de-
1. Hasan, Rea., 170. 
2. Ibid~' 178. 
termine whether their fundamental presupposition is warranted. 
Met in its most elementary argument form, this presupposition 
asserts: 
All is being, 
All being is conceptual, 
All that is conceptual is object and objective, 
Therefore: All (being) is object and objective. 1 
This is bedrock for the Nee-Realists, the axiomatic 
foundation upon which their system stands or falls. 
1. Hasan, Re~., 199. 
CHAPTER IW 
PLATONISM AND NEO-REALISM COl.VlPARED 
1. Ontological Extensity. 
From the description offered in the preceding two 
chapters, it is seen that both Platonism and Neo-Realism 
award a separate reality to those entities which constitute 
their respective realms. It was also seen that these enti-
ties have a being independent of the space-time world inhab-
ited by particular things. Straightaway, the extent to 
which Plato carried his treatment of the Realm of Ideas and 
the extent to which the Neo-Realists went in espousing a 
Realm of Possibility lie at the very heart of the contrast 
between the two doctrines. Plato's Realm of Ideas tended 
to be a realm of ideals, containing only the beautiful, t he 
best, the most important; in the Neo-Realist' s Realm of Poe-
sibility, on the other hand, everything that might be, how-
ever ugly, bad, or trivial, had its eternal niche. 
The Platonic view is given its most complete expres-
sion in the Parmenides. Plato is put in the position of 
positively commiting himself to the belief that 
there are forms corresponding to the fundamental notions 
of ethics--Right (I[~W-toll?, Good (a.yo.96v'), Noble (KW'V) ; 
he is doubtful about forms of organisms and physical 
things (Man, Fire, Water); in the case of such things 
as mud, dirt, hair-- i.e. sensible things which do not 
appear to have a recognizable type of structure--he is 
inclined to think that there are no forms. But he i s 
not quite sure that consistency would not demand forms 
of these too, though he is afraid that the admission 
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might lead him into 11 abys~al nonsense." 1 
The question to be raised here is already suggested by Pla-
to's apprehensiveness in the preceding passag~ since he 
realized that the demand for consistency is far more cru-
cial than the demand for preference. The importance of this 
demand for consistency is further stress ed in the c ensure 
i ssued by Parmenides and which Taylor interpolates as meg.n-
i ng tta man who is going to admit any kind of reality i n s en-
sible things ought to be prepared to 1 go the whole hog. 111 2 
I n addition to this limitation, the content of Plato's 
re a lm is even further restricted, according to Windelband , 
i n that the evolutionary character of Plato's writings 
placed a stress on certain types of Ideas rather than oth-
ers formerly recognized. Again, stress upon certain classes 
of Ideas does not mean denial of other Ideas. 3 However, the 
effect of the above limitations suggests either of two con-
elusions concerning the content of the Realm of Id.eas; t hat 
is to say, either Plato left the question unanswered, or the 
4 
answer he suggested led. him to inconsistency. 
The Neo-Realistic doctrine, on the other hand, has 
the virtue of specificity. They believed that the "real 
universe consists of the space-time system of existents, 
1. Taylor, PMW, 353-354. References are to Parmenide~ 130. 
2 • Ibid • , 3 51. 
3 . Ross, PTI, 281. 
4. Plato's denial of Forms to things such as mud, dirt, and 
hair must be taken into consideration when remembering 
t hat he affirms existence to such Forms as the table and 
bed. 
. 1 
t ogether with all that is presupposed by that system.n It 
is the all that is presupposed by that system which, taken 
toge ther with the system of existents, constitutes the Nee-
Realist's Realm of Possibility. This realm was believed to 
be the summum genus, the content of which nwhether terms or 
propositions, real or unreal, subsists of its own right i n 
2 the all-inclusive universe of being. 11 The kind of being 
was the same sort as that of mathematical terms or proposi-
3 tiona which are of an objective order. 
The contrast between Platonism and Nee-Realism wi th 
regard to the ontological content of their respective sys-
tems thus devolves upon the extent to which each accepts or 
rejects the possible entities that inhere in the total on-
t ological universe. The Nee-Realist 
accords full ontological statue to the things of 
thought as well as to the things of sense, to log-
ical entities as well as physical4entitiee, or to subsietente as well as existents. 
vfuereas for the Nee-Realist the Realm of Possibility was 
the world of sensation, conception, logic, plus possibil-
ity--all recapitulated in an eternal sense-- the Platonic 
Realm of Ideas was more exclusively devoted to mathematic al 
and moral qualities, aesthetic values, and types of species 
in the organic world. 5 From such exclusive devotion the 
1. Holt et al., NR, 255. 
2. Ibid.' 366. 
3. Ibid. 
4. Ibid., 35. 
5. Windelband, HP, 121. 
5'7 
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content of the Platonic Realm of Ideas may be thought of a s 
the very acme of aristocracy, whereas the Nee-Realistic 
Realm of Possibility was democratic in the extreme, other-
wise, however, expressing the very apotheosis of the basic 
Platonic position concerning Ideas. The upshot is that 
whereas Plato would drastically limit the membership of 
his realm, the Nee-Realist would "go the whole hogtt by al-
lowing a democratic universality in its membership. 
2. Novelty. 
The question as to the nature of novelty under 
Plato's system is in one sense corollary to the question 
concerning the extent of the realm itself, since novelty 
implies both the coming into being and the factor of change . 
The difficulty of the question is compounded if the alter-
native be made, on the one hand, to explain the Ideas as 
fixed hypostatized entities which function as members of 
a closed system; or, on the other hand, to attribute an open-
textured quality to the Ideas which would permit a flexibil -
ity in accounting for any so-called newly created Ideas. 
And in as much as the Ideas have been endowed with the char-
acteristics of individuality, abstractness, eternality, and 
immutability, any interpretation must both consider and 
account for these characteristics. 
A strict interpretation is possible in accounting 
for both the Ideas of quality and relation and for Ideas: of 
phenomenal objects with regard to novelty, and to do eo 
within the framework of the characteristics imputed to the 
Ideas. In eo doing the condition must be made that there 
are no ~ Ideas as such. Strictly speaking, changelee~­
nee~ and eternality prohibit this possibility. Neverthe-
lees, newly developed relatione may be created out of the 
manifestations that take place among the Ideas at the level 
of the phenomenal world, and the product of these manifest-
atione may be regarded as novel. Hence, one may say 
that each Idea as a definite Idea differs from other 
definite Ideas and stands in a definite relation to 
them. For that reason the Idea may be apprehended: 
and described not only through its own characterist-
ics, but also from the point of view of other Ideas, 
i.e., by the similarities and differences in their 
c harac teri s tics .1 
Novelty here does not mean coming into being, since the 
Ideas are, in one sense, already predetermined. It means, 
rather, a new synthesis_ taking place among or between the 
Ideas which are manifested ~ the phenomenal level and 
which continue to be sustained in their individuality, 
abstractness, eternality, and immutability. Moreover, in 
so far as the qualities of the whole are true also of the 
parts of that whole, these characteristics are inherent i n 
the newly synthesized .Idea. A. man who becomes a political 
figure ideally would possess the qualities of knowledge, 
maturity, decisiveness, honesty, tact, far-sightedness, 
1 . Ritter, EPP, 165. 
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etc. Should this happy combination of qualities be acquired 
by some individual, then it is conceivable that he might 
further manifest the quality of leadership. Or, to use Pla-
to's own example in The Republic, justice is the quality 
which makes it possible for the three we have already 
considered, wisdom, courage, and temperance, to take 
their place in the commonwealth, and so long as it re-
mains present ~ecures their continuance, must be the 
remaining one. · 
What has been said of the Ideas of qualities and 
relations may in general be said also of Ideas of phenom-
enal objects. The UNIVAC may be considered to exhibit the 
product of manifold relations created by a complex combin-
ation of simples. The earlier analogy of the simples hot-
round-bright-yellow that combine to create t he Idea of Sun-
hood is also a case in point. Again, it is relevant to 
cite a passage offered earlier: "whenever two or three dat a . 
of sense are gathered together under a common name, there 
2 
a Form is present also." Thus the theory of simples helps 
to g ive a significant account of novelty when dealing with 
the classes of Ideas which enter into the creation of more 
complex Idea-classes. 
The Neo-Realist is not directly confronted vlith the 
problem of novelty at the ontological level, since for him 
all the possibilities of the ontological universe already 
subsist. Moreover, because all the possibilities are al-
1. Cornford, RP, 127. See also: Windelband, HP, 125-126. 
2 . Fuller, HP, I, 131. 
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r eady ''there," none can be created; neither in the totally 
new sense, nor in the sense of a newly created synthesis. 
Since for the Nee-Realist all possible terms, all possible 
relations, and all possible propositions as determined by 
their tautologies, converses, contraries, and contradictions 
a re already atomic subsistent parts which exhaust the sub-
sistent whole; and since the content of the whole cannot b e 
greater than the totality of its parts; then, it would fol -
low that any attempt to add another part, such as a novel 
term, proposition, or relation, would render meaningless 
what was meant by the "whole" in the minor premise. There-
fore, novelty, except as a logically subsistent term consti-
1 
tuting a part of the subsistent whole, is impossible. 
The individual subsistent entity of the Nee-Realist 
may be compared directly to the Ideas of Plato as conceived 
of as simples in the Realm of Ideas. At this point, how-
ever , the comparative extensity between the two systems a s 
it pertains to ontologica l primitives, i.e. simples or sub-
sistents, is again revived to illustrate the different ca-
pabilities of either system in the e~lanation of novelty. 
Merely by denying a theory of simples as explanatory of the 
content of Plato's ontological universe, the problem of 
accounting for novelty is seriously complicated, to say 
nothing of the question of extensity. On the other hand, 
the Nee-Realist is not faced with this problem, since his 
uni v erse, by definition, is constituted by all possible 
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subsistents, primitives, or simples. In terms of explana-
tory value, the Nee-Realists have this obvious advantage 
the Platonist lacks. 
3. The _Relation of the Linguistic to the Ontological Univer s .e_. 
The theory of Ideas expressed by Plato, although p r i-
marily a statement of a metaphysical position, carries a log-
ical import. From a metaphysical point of view the Ideas- h ave 
already been characterized as timeless, individual, immutab l e, 
and incorporeal essences which, if taken collectively, com-
prise a supra-sensible world that for Plato was the ultimate 
reality, a separate reality, dependent upon naught for its 
eternal nature. Thus far, nothing has been added to the e ar-
lier discussion except to assert that the theory is partly 
logical. But the sole basis for a treatment of the logical 
side of the matter stems from the earlier characterization 
of the Ideas in so far as each is what is expressed by a 
1 
significant general term. 
In so far as general terms are used in the dialogues , 
they apply to qualities, relations, negative notions, and to 
types of concrete objects. Plato's teaching would support 
this view to the extent that the general term may be used a s 
a logical concept just so far as the term was based upon an-
2 
objective reality, viz., Ideas. This point may be further 
stressed, Plato believed, in that our thoughts and words mus t 
1 . See above: Chapter II. 
2. Ritter, EPP, 105. 
. ; 
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refer to an immutable reality if the predications or names 
1 
we use are correct, otherwise our thoughts would be engulfed 
in a babbling subjectivism that "would preclude all under-
standing or rational interchange of thought. uZ What Plato 
is asserting here, in so far as it pertains to the Idea and 
the meaning of the general term which correctly names it, 
is the relation of identity. This relation is further qual-
ified by an a priori feature, namely, the Ideas expressed by 
general terms exist ante rem et non in rebus.. Thus our use 
of general words, or terms, 
depends upon a knowledge of Ideas or Forms which are 
the reality behind the classes of natural objects and 
artifacts. We know the ultimate Form and are so able: 
to recognize its incomplete manifestations in sensible 
things. Knowing the Form of Man we can recognize a 
man '\'Then we see one and use the general word "man" sig-
nificantly • • • • Our use of such general words as . 11 dog11 
and "table" is possible because, first, Forms exist 
externally in the world of Being and have their shadowy 
manifestations in the world of Becoming and because, 
secondly, we know these Forms innately so that we do 
not cognize but !:!!-cognize the manifestations.3 
In addition to characterizing the kind of thing the.t 
extends beyond the orbit of sense experience, that is, the 
universal, the general word in so far as it correctly char-
acterizes the Idea has two further important explanatory 
functions. The first of these is the facility offered in 
accounting for the cohesive quality in experience made pos-
sible by the ante rem et non in rebus. Thus our use of gen-
1. Ritter, EPP, 113. 
2. Ibid. 
3. Aaron, TOU, 141 • 
eral notions such as right-angled triangle may be explained. 
An instance of such an explanation may be recalled when Soc-
rates in the Meno educes, so to speak, the existence of a 
universal roughly equivalent to n a2 plus b2 equals c2" as i t 
applies to all right-angled triangles (the corollary intent 
of Socrates to explain the immortality of the soul need not 
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be considered here). The universal thus derived became mean-
ingful due to the clarifying function it served in explaining 
the nature of certain triangles which previously possessed 
a quality of 11 rnere approximation" to one another. A second 
function that the general word serves is that of helping to 
explain the not yet experienced. On Plato's view, only-by 
having gained a cognizance of Courage, Temperance, and Wis-
dom could the philosopher-king then envisage the ideal of 
civic Justice. The necessary conditions may in this case 
be thought of as conjunctive antecedents to the consequent 
Justice. This example is not isolated. Other qualities, 
either simples or complexes, may become conjuncta which com-
bine in such a way that they may cha~acterize something 
hitherto unexperienced. 
Thus the general term, in so far as it correctly 
describes the universal Plato regarded as being ante rem et 
non in rebus, allows us to talk about the kind of thing that 
extends beyond experience, helps us to talk about the: co-
herence of experience, and to talk, if at all, about the 
1. Jowett, DOP, II~ 41-46 (Meno 82-85). 
yet unexperienced. These functions cannot be minimized; nor 
can the condition that the general term must bear a meaning 
relation of identicalness to the universal, or Idea, which 
it purports to connote. 
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The central position of the Nee-Realist is very clos~ 
to that of the Platonist regarding the ultimate function of 
the linguistic structure in relation to the ontological. 
Moreover, the general term for the Platonist is obviously 
comparable in several of its characteristics with that of 
the 11 term11 which the Nee-Realist defines as "any entity whic h 
can stand in any relation, and terms can be classified as phy s-
ical and mental entities, complexes and simple~, existents and 
1 
subsistents, classes, individuals, and relations." Even 
though the Nee-Realist's · usage of "term" is seen to share 
many common areas with that of the Platonist, two important 
departures are noteworthy. In as much as the term may ba 
regarded as a subsistent, and in as much as the subsistent. 
"denominates any one of the actual and possible objects of 
thought, "2 the theory of possibility as: the Nee-Realist con-
ceives of it would preclude any one-to-one comparison of the 
subsistent and the Idea under a strict Platonic interpreta-
tion. The second departure is even more dynamically charac-
teristic of the logical character of Neo-Realism than the 
first. Primarily this is due to the fact that the Neo-Real -
1. Holt et al, NR, 175. 
2 . ~·, 253. 
1s t regards the subsistent as having "an inseparable aspec t. 
of its meaning an 1 is 1 relation to some other subsistent; 
hence every subsistent is or involves a proposition." 1 The 
stress given to the proposition is quite unique to t he Nee-
Realist's position since they regard the total system of 
propositions, as comprised of subsistent terms, to exhaus t 
the content of being. The body of propositions comes to 
form a calculus of being through which reality is reduced 
to logical form. 2 This calculus is constitutive of the 
world; and the terms, classes, and relations "studied by 
the logician, are truly aspects of the world about him as 
are the phenomena of heat and light, studied by the phys-
icist. "3 
For both the Platonist and the Nee-Realist the lin -
guistic structure serves the function of being the logical 
analogue for the ontological structure. The Ideas are fo r 
the Platonist what the subsistent term is for the Neo~eal-
1st; the descriptive predicates assigned both the Ideas and 
the subsistent terms apply equally in each case, except a s 
entailed by the Nee-Realist notion of possibility. The dif-
ference between the Platonist and the Nee-Realist is more 
a matter of emphasis than one of kind. For the Platonist 
the types of Ideas seem to be derived largely from percep-
tion, i.e. there is no mention made by Plato of Ideas which , 
1. Holt et al., NR, 253. The 1 i s' pertains to predic a tion. 
2 • Evans, NR OR , 76. 
3 . Ibid. , 42. 
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broadly speaking, did not have some experiential counterpart. 
The Nee-Realist accepts all the terms that the Platonist r ec-
ognizee, but goes a step further in a logical direction. This 
is to say, the Nee-Realist recognizee a formally structured 
calculus of subsistent terms expressed in logical propoei-
tion-form, such that the tautologies, converses, c ontraries, 
and contradictories expressed by each proposition are extend-
1 
ed to an ontologically exhaustive degree. In short, the Neo-
Realist held that logically conceived possibility is the s ame 
as t he subsistential content of possibility. The question as 
to the ontological extensity is again seen to underly the ma-
jor differences between the two views. 
4. Epistemology ~ Subordinate. 
The dualism evident in Plato's metaphysics extended 
to include his theory of epistemology as well. He held ada-
mantly to the view that the Realm of Ideas was presuppos ed. by 
the corporeal world of things in that the Ideas were ontolog -
i cally independent of, logically prior to, and the necessary 
condition for the corporeal world and any knowledge about it. 
Accordingly, any account of Plato's epistemology must take 
into consideration the independence of his metaphysical posi-
tion, as well as to show the dependence of his epistemology 
upon the metaphysics. 
Plato believed that Knowledge, as such, is mediated 
. 1 . Chapter III, above. 
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by the Ideas. Any lesser cognitive functioning such as i m-
ag i n ings, opinion, or belief are the consequents produc ed 
by the effect upon the sense of the fleeting world of change . 
Re al Knowledge results only in the apprehending of the I deas 
through a sort of direct intuitive acquaintance or "vision, '' 1 
such that in the last analysis one arrives at Knowledge by 
"never making u.se of any sensible object, but only of Forms , 
mov i ng through Forms from one to the other, and ending with 
2 Form s.~' This is seen even more vividly when contrasting 
t he Ideas which are perfect, undeceiving, and fixed, with 
the discrepancies which occur in perception of sense s o high-
ly sub ject to error. Hallucinatory, illusory, and delusive 
experi ences are to be found· only at the level of the phen-
omena.l wor ld, Plato believed, whereas the experience of Tr uth, 
ab solute and ideal, wa s the happy consequent of apprehend-
ing the Ide as. 
On Plato's te r ms, the apprehending of the Ideas was 
1. The metaphorical use is Platonic. When alluding to the 
epistemic relation Pl ato often lapsed into vagueness, 
metaphor, or both. This instance occurs in the Republic : 
" Without having had a vision of this Form no one can act 
with wisdom, either in hie own life or in matters of s t a te." 
Cornford, RP, 231 (Rep., 517). The emphasis upon rat i on-
ality in the apprehending of the Ideas is always strong ly 
indicated, but never fully explained in the dialogues. I n 
his e.ccount of the Good Plato tells us that 11 the summit of 
the intelligible world is reached in philosophic discuss i on 
by one who aspires, thrg ugh the discourse of reason unaided 
by any of the senses Lbut not, certainly, by analogies in-
volving these sense§:i~ to make his way in every case to 
the essential and perseveres until he has grasped £y puree 
lnt elligence _the very nature of Goodness itseif. 11 Cornford, 
RP , 252 (Rep., 532), italics mine. 
2 . cornford, RP, 226 (Rep., 511). 
not a simple procesg. In one account he suggests that a 
near life-long training is necessary, one which lends par-
ticular emphasis to the rigorous development of a mathemat-
ical and philosophical conscience. The result of such an 
emphasis upon rational development, together with certain 
69 
cardinal virtues, would tend to produce a man par excellence, 
the philosopher-king, who is best able to apprehend the Ideas 
apart from their phenomenal shadows. The epistemic side of 
the question stresses the point that through rational devel-
opment the errors of sense perception are minimized and the 
insights gained through wisdom serve as the necessary condi-
1 tion in apprehending the ultimate reality, the Ideas. 
The account given here no more gratifyingly answers 
the question, "What is the precise manner in which the Ideas 
become known?" than the explanation of "participation" given 
in the Parmenides. The I"e,ason for this is,, for the most part, 
the same. For example, in speaking of the philosopher-kings 
of the Republic, Plato said that they 
must lift up the eye Hof th~ soul to gaze on that which 
sheds light on all things; and when they have ~ the 
Good itself, take it as the pattern for the right ord-
ering of 2he state and of the individual, themselves 
included. 
The lapse into analogy--this time concerning a visual per-
ception of something the nature of which is abstract--again 
precludes decisive treatment as to the exact cognitive rela-
1. Chernisse, Art.(l936), 452. 
2. Cornford, RP, 262 (Republic,_ 540), italics mine. 
t i on. On the negative side, both conceptualism and nomin-
alism are rejected; moreover, in the Theaetetus there was 
a disposal 
of the identification of knowledge with sensation or 
any form of simple apprehension. We have also seen 
that pure relativism is untenabli alike in the theory 
of knowledge and in metaphysics. 
The surviving theory is one of immanence so often associated 
with epistemological realism, but Plato's explanation is so 
obfuscated by metaphor that more questions are created than 
are answered. 
The Nee-Realists make a laudably decisive and thor-
ough-going attempt to structure their epistemic conclu sions 
within the framework of their metaphysical system. The Nee -
Realists, as do the Platonists, regard metaphysics as 11 log-
2 ically prior to the theory of knowledge," which is to say 
that the subsistent terms · and propositions comprising the-
calculus of being, or Realm of Possibility, are presupposed 
by the epistemologist who uses these terms. 3 Ontological 
independence is a further characteristic common to both the 
Platonic and Nee-Realistic systems; in this the Nee-Realist 
holds that metaphysics is not indebted to their theory of 
knowledge either for its problems or its solutions. 4 Me t a-
physical reality consists of propositions, and terms, which 
are not events in space-time as are those events with which 
1. Taylor, PMW, 347-348. 
2. Holt et ~' NR, 53; see also page : 69. 
3 . Ibid., 74. 
4. Ibid.' 53. 
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t he epistemologist deals. To the contrary, the propositions 
descriptive of ultimate reality, that is, of the universe of 
being, do not themselves 
come into being or get created by the student who first 
learn~ that they are true. They are discovered and not 
made, as truly as was the American continent discovered 
and not made by the explorers of the fifteenth and six-
teenth centuries. Thus mathematics as a system of true 
propositions has been in part discovered by man; but 
this discovery or that failure to discover did not add 
or subtract anything to or from mathematics, did not 
make any of its propositions true or false, did not al-
ter it in any way. Two plus two equaled four, and the 
sum of the angles of a plane triangle in Euclidean spac e-
equaled two right angles when thl earth was a molten 
mass, as truly as they do today. -
The Platonist and Nee-Realist · are in firm agreement as to 
. 
the dependent status of epistemology o~ metaphysics, a rela-
2 tional status which is asymmetrical. And in as much as the 
Nee-Realist tlasserts the independence of reality in the know-
ing of it, the nee-Realist is also a Platonic realist. 113 
With respect to their theory of knowledge the Neo-
4 Realists have vigorously sought to achieve objectivity. To 
gain this objectivity they lay stress upon the relational 
aspect of consciousness, 5 a stress that had its parallel in 
1. Holt et al., NR, 57. 
2. Chernisse, Art.(l936), 451. 
3. Holt et al., NR, 35. 
4. Ibid. :-1(.5· 
5. Ibid., 'A mind or consciousness is a class- or group of 
entities within the subsisting universe, as a physical ob-
.j~ t is ' another class or group. One entity or comple-x of 
entities can belong to two or more classes or groups at the 
same time, as one point can be the intersection of two or 
more lines; so that an entity can be an integral part of 
a physical object, of a mathematical manifold, the field 
of reality, and one or any number of consciousnessee at 
the same time." 
I 
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the recent developments in the relation theories of both the 
na tural sciences and symbolic logic. Because of the explan-
atory value as shown by the objectivity of the scientific 
and logical relat ions , the of ten misleading common sense ex-
planations were rejected as a criterion of knowledge. On t h e 
other hand, the Nee-Rea lists believed that the desired obj ec -
tivity could be achieved 
by isolating the epistemological problem and studying 
the cognitive relation obta ining between any knower or-
apprehender and any object that he knows or apprehends 
without prejudg ing or even raising the question as t o 
the ultimate nature of t~e app rehending subjects or of 
the apprehended objects. 
It was through the stress upon cognitive relations, conc e ived 
by the Nee-Rea list as objective, that the basis for the dev-
elopment of a relational theory of consciousness was re ac hed. 
It soon became obvious ths.t t he conscious field was unavoid-
ab ly fundamental to the Nee-Realist's theory of knowledge . 
The ego-centric predicament was a ubiquitous difficulty in 
that 
consciousness cannot be eliminated from one's field of 
study, because I study, I eliminate, etc., are all sit-
uations in which the relation, consciousness, is pres-
ent. We cannot therefore find anything outside of con-
sciousness, because •• •- finding is a form of conscious -
ness. It is method.ologically impossible to comp are a 
thing before or after it has been in another's con-
sciousness without one's own consciousness being brought 
into play. Moreover, a knowledge situation cannot be 
analyzed into its parts in order that the physical a s-
pect mi ght be dealt with, because dealing with implies 
consciousness. Finally, when the consciousness feature 
is eliminated fro~ any situation, nothing can be learne d 
about the affair. 
1. .i'~ ontague, Art. (1937), 143. 
2 • Evans , NR OR , 77. 
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Gi ven this field of consciousness, the central question for 
the Nee-Realist became one of explaining how the content of 
the cognitive area of experience was related to the ultimate 
nature of reality which the Nee-Realists claimed to be prior . 
The answer given to this by the Nee-Realists was a theory of 
immanence which would make perception the ultimate test of 
reality, 1 thus omitting reference to epistemology which itself 
is not logically fundamental. For the Nee-Realist, percep~ 
2 tion simply is; what is revealed through perception, i.e. 
the percept, simply is; the percept as the correspondent of 
any possible subsistent entity or term is thus the ontolog-
ical primative as cognized. 11 0bjects known are identical 
with the content of knowledge. 113 Hence, in so far as per-
ceptions are directly presented, perception reveals the na~ 
ture of reality. 
The areas of Platonic and Nee-Realistic agreement 
have already been mentioned; the area for disagreement lie s 
primarily in the nature of perception. Whereas the Platonist 
pla.ced perception at the nether end of the cognitive scale, 
the Nee-Realist glorifies it to the extent of equating the 
ultimate revelations of perception, namely percepts, with the 
subsistent terms of being. For Plato, perception gave inform-
ation about the phenomenal world, the shadow-like reality 
1. Evans, NROR, 119. 
2. Holt et al., NR, 66. 
3. Evans, NROR, 119. 
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which was only approximately real; Knowledge via Reason was 
the surest contact with the eternal verities. The Nee-Real-
1st treated mind and matter as relata in the cognitive rel-
ation such that either or both might reveal the ultimate 
field of being through any of the possible manifold relations 
into which each or both may enter. Verification of true be-
ing for Plato lay in Reason; for the Nee-Realist perception 
was the ultimate test. The difference here aptly illustrates 
the fact that a metaphysical position may be supported by a ny 
one of several epistemologies, the former not being crucially 
dependent upon the form of the latter. 
5. The Place of Error. 
The treatment of error as given by the Platonist ma y 
best be considered from the standpoint of the Ideas, but cer-
tainly not from the Realm of Phenomena. This is not to say 
that Plato didn't realize that aberrations in perception do 
take place, or that conceptual operations may be faulty when 
dealing with mathematical abstracts. It was the case that 
in the Platonic system that Knowledge does not occur at the 
level of opinion wherein our conceptual or phenomenal recog-
1 
nition.s take place. Moreover, at this level the question 
as to truth and error never really arises since objects of 
2 
opinion and objects of Knowledge are intrinsically different. 
In the case concerning objects of opinion the necessary ele- · 
1. Chernisse, Art.(1936), 449. 
2. Ritter, EPP, 126. 
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me nt of Re a son is absent, a.nd without a clear account for 
the Rea sons of an assertion, no knowledge is had. 1 In the 
case concerning the objects of Knowledge, Plato sought to 
escape the error which involved subjectivity; it was the 
function of Reason to make good this escape. 
The account of error, or falsehood, that Plato held 
possible was explained by one's mistakenly_ conceiving cer-
tain contradictory predicates to be attributed to a subjec t-
Idea. This does not mean that the Ideas themselves were er r-
2 
oneous, rather, one's conception of them was subject to error . 
Plato believed tha t while "every Form is different from every 
other and is not any other, some Forms can be combined \>lith 
one another, whereas some cannot. 113 Hence, contradictory 
predicates may not be asserted of Ideas if Reason attains t he 
level of Knowledge. For example, the Idea of Motion may no t 
be predicated of Rest, nor the Idea of Sameness predicated of 
4 Difference, and vice versa, yet these antinomous Ideas may 
be asserted of some Idea having an existential counterpart 
1. Ritter, EPP, 126. 
2. Elliptically stated, the argument from the Sophist is this: 
11 A sentence must and cannot help having a subject. 11 Soph 262. 
11 Every sentence must have a certain quality." Soph 263. 
"seeing that language is true and false, and that thought 
is the conversation of the soul with herself, and opinion 
is the end of thinking, and imagination or phantasy is t he 
union of sense and opinion, the inference is that some of 
them, since they are akin to langua~e, should have an ele-
ment of falsehood as well as of truth." Soph 264. 
nIt would be f antast·ic if it could be shown that falsehood 
is a realitr. belonging to the class of real being LWhich is 
Knowledg~. 1 Soph 266. 
3 . Ful:J.er, HP, I, 157. 
4. ~- , 158. 
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just so long as they are asserted other than conjointly. 1 
The nature of error, as Plato conceived of it, emerges fir st 
from the absence of Reason whereby Knowledge of the Ideas is 
precluded; second, error 
comes from our failure to distinguish the Idea.s that 
are both different and uncombinable from those which, 
in spite of their differences from one another and 
not being one another, can nevertheles& be combined • . 
Such failure results in our e.ssertion of the existenc2 
of non-existent combinations of Forms and vice versa. 
The problem of error which was to become a major 
issue in the Nee-Realist's theory of consciousness resulted 
from their unique answer to the question of what error con-
sisted in. The Nee-Realists held that error occuring at the 
level of perception may take either of two forms, but both 
result 
from a distortion of the real object in producing it s 
effect on the brain. The distortion may be (1) phys i -
cal or peripherally physiological, in which case we 
have the so-c alled illusions, or (2) it may be central, 
due to the cerebral apperception mass, in which case 
we have the error of inference.3 
When the projective manifold that is consciousness comes: i n-
to relation with the external world, the ner~ous system di s -
covers the errors revealed to it. Error, then, is a relation 
resulting not as a product of the nervous system--since " t he 
nervous system is a contrivance to deal with a physical state 
4 
of affaire of which error is only a very delicate instance"--
1. Fuller, HP, I, 158. 
2. Ibid. 
3. Holt et_ al., NR, 291. 
4 . I b id., 467. 
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nor as something created by consciousness; error is revealed 
as a result of the practical discrepancies between the sub-
1 jective and physical manifolds. 
An important point that the Nee-Realist wishes to 
stress is that when things are perceived, so they are. This 
is not to say as things are perceived so they really are; 
rather, while all perceived things are things, not all per-
2 
ceived things are real. The erroneous percept is the pro-
duct of the relation obtaining between the consciousness of 
the experiencer and the referent of the exte r nal world. Ab-
errations may be due to any one of many ca.us es , but such 
aberrations do not derogate against the be i ng of the percept. 
Accordingly, it .may be seen that *'the indiscernibility of 
seeming from being can be naturally attributed not to the 
3 terms, but to the relation in which they stand." The per-
cept which, although erroneously perceived as originally the 
relation between the nervous system and the referent, is 
identical to the corresponding subsistent term in the uni-
ver s e of being. To this degree the theory of error advanced 
by the Nee-Realists "results from dividing by log ic a l abstrac-
tion what, for comm on sense, is one Lerroi/ and then hyposta-
tizing the distinction made." 4 The hypostatized entities of 
error take their p l ace in the all-inclusive Re a lm of Possi-
1. Evans, NROR, 125. 
2. Holt et al., NR, 358. 
3. Ibid!, 466. 
4. Evans, NROR, 138. 
b ility right beside the actual entities. The illusory oasis 
has a being just as much as the Atlantic Ocea~; similarly, 
the inferential proposition that nfive plus seven equals 
eighteenn is just as much as the proposition 11 two plus two 
equ a ls four. u 
The Platonist would turn away in disgust a t such a 
polyglot universe comprised of plethoric uninstanti ated 
essences. It remains to b e shown whether such an aristo-
cra tic pose may be maintained in the light of logic. 
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C:HAPT'EE V 
CRITIC'ISM 
1. General Ontological Considerations. 
To consider exhaustively the explanations of real ity 
as offered by both schools of conceptual realists would pre-
suppose 11 all the theories and facts of modern knowledge. 11 1 
Such explanations would further involve the organization of 
the total body of knowledge in such a way that the manifo ld, 
facts and theories could be harmonized significantly, that 
is, an explanation which fulfills the sufficient if not nee-
essary conditions of consistency, completeness, and economy 
or elegance. Although Plato may be considered to have ex-
plicated a broad general system, an exhaustive treatment of 
his explanation would be frustrated by virtue of the devel-
opments in the fund of knowledge over the intervening two 
thousand years. On the other hand, the Nee-Realists who had 
the advantage of the accumulated body of knowledge during 
this span of two millennia, did not in point of fact develop 
what may be called a 11 systemn which would explain reality in 
toto. 2 A treatment of either position in terms of an exhaus-
tively significant description is, therefore, rendered i m-
1. Feibleman, Ont., 126. 
2. Holt at al.:-NR, 36. "There are endless special philos-
ophical questions to which there is no inevitable realist-
ic answer, such questions as mind and body, teleology, the 
good, and freedom ••• philosophy of life, no characteristic 
verdict on the issues of religion." 
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possible. 
There is, however, a point of contact between Platon-
ic Realism and Neo-Realism which is amenable to definitive 
treatment. This is the area of ontological commitment made 
by each school which came to light through the description 
offered in Chapters II and III. The sort of evaluation t hat 
can be made of these schools may be justly narrowed to t he 
ontological level if the conditione--consistency, complete-
ness, and economy or elegance--evoked expressly for the \vhole 
of reality can be applied to the level of ontology in partie-
ular. For sake of clarity these conditions require a note 
of further explanation. 
In judging the consistency of an explanation or the-
ory, the term "consistency" may express either of two prop-
erties. First, it may mean general consistency in that a 
theory is consistent with all existing knowledge; or, second, 
it may mean self-consistency in that the theory itself i s 
1 internally consistent. This is to say, consistency means 
squaring with all the facts in one case, and in the other 
case consistency requires a non-contradictory feature of 
2 
certain selected facts. Ideally, for both general consi s -
tency and internal consistency it is a sufficient condition 
that 
l:. See also: Feibleman, Ont., 131. "Any system is a whole 
and for any whole there is the criterion of consistency 
between its parts •••• For any whole there is in addition 
t he criterion of consistency between the whole and other 
wholes." 
2. Joad, GTP, 445. 
the axioms and theorems be true propositions. Since 
ita theorems are the logical consequences of its ax-
ioms, any interpretation which makes its axioms true 
will make its theorems true also. Hence it is suffi-
cient for the purpose of proving a system consistent 
to find an1 interpretation which makes all of ita ax-ioms true. 
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In as much it is the present concern to determine the inter-
nal consistency of certain ontologica.l axioms developed in 
the Platonic and Neo-Realistic systems, a treatment of the 
complementary systems of axioms and theorems governing the ir 
total philosophy is not intended. Moreover, if it were in-
tended, it may well be questioned whether such a treatment 
would be at all fruitful. Bertrand Russell maintains that 
no one has yet succeeded in inventing a philosophy at 
once credible and self-consistent •••• A philosophy 
which is not self-consistent cannot be wholly true, 
but a philosophy which ie self-consistent can very wel l 
be wholly false. The most fruitful philosophies have 
glaring inconai~tenciea, but for that reason have been 
partially true. 
It remains to be seen which realistic theory expressed above 
is better characterized by consistency. 
The condition of completenes~ refers to the inclu-
aiveness as expressed by any whole system in terms of account-
ing for all the parts or sub-parts. Of no less importance, 
adequacy in the integration of these parts must be met; all 
those parts which belong to the system must be included, and 
none of those parts which do belong may be left out. Beyond 
this requirement for accurate quantification, the relation 
1. Copi, SL, 178-179. 
2. Russell, HWP, 613. 
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between the parts must be such that a tightly related system 
results; looseness is devastating when rigor is required to 
1 balance and coordinate a system. This sense of complete-
ness, however ideal, borders on vagueness. A more precise 
statement of completeness may be given when the formulas of 
any given system are divided into three groups: 
first, all formulas which are provable as theorems with-
in the system; second, all formulas whose negations are 
prouable within the system; and third, all formulas such 
that neither they nor their negations are provable with-
in the system. For consistent_ systems the first . and 
second groups are distinct, that is, have no formulas i n 
common. Any system whose third group is empty, contain-
ing no2formulas at all, is said to be deductively ~­plete. 
The above defintion is roughly equivalent to saying that " a 
deductive system is complete when every formula constructed 
on its base is either a theorem or else its addition as an 
3 
axiom would make the system inconsistent. 11 However, as a 
result of Godel's theorem, the requirement is made that the 
4 proofs of consistency lie outside that system; should the 
attemptbe made to include the proofs, the system becomes i n-
consistent. The notion of completeness in terms of a closed 
system becomes suspect, so that the distinction between a 
strict consistency and a strict completeness must in some 
sense be compromised. As a consequence of Godel's theorem, 
a delimiting condition is imposed upon the closed mathemat-
1. Feibleman, Ont •. , 131. 
2. Copi, SL, 1~ 
3. Ibid. 
4. Feibleman, Ont., 701. 
i c al system; similar examples ma.y be drawn from logic (Rus-
sell paradox) and physics (Heisenberg's indeterminacy prin-
1 
ciple). From such examples it is reasonable to doubt the 
possibility of any ontological system including its own 
proof. Such a consideration has the support of intuitive 
acceptability, because in so far as ontology may be defined 
as "the widest of a finite set of systems," 2 · and in so far 
as this definition implies a whole set, the knowability of 
the "ontological system must be kept open to the prospect 
of including more and more. 113 Thus it would seem that the 
very condition of completeness must remain at an outermost 
ideal limit, and that systems may only hope to achieve an 
approximation of completeness, subject to the truth value 
of the axioms which they claim, to the internal consistency 
of these axioms, and to the proof of these axioms outside 
the system itself. 
Of secondary importance, but still of primary con-
sideration, is the question of methodology. In formulating 
the axioms and theorems of an ontological system there arise s 
a demand for economy. This condition is met when each axiom 
of a system is independent to the extent that it is not de--
rivable from some other axiom. A system is not to be con-
damned logically for having as its members one or more de-
pendent axioms, but we should say of such axioms that they 
1 . Quine, FI.;PW, 19. , 
2. Feibleman, Ont., 122. 
3. Ibid. 
are "redundant,," and hence lack what mathematicians call 
- 1 
"elegance." Moreover, the condition of economy may be 
applied to two or more competing ontological systems as 
well as to any redundant axioms within a particular system. 
This is to say, if different ontological systems explain 
reality equally well in terms of consistency and complete-
ness--which implicitly involves a sufficiency in squaring 
with all the facts about reality--the system which engen-
ders the fewest complexities is qualified not only by its 
simplicity, but also by its aesthetic appeal in terms of 
2 harmony and grace of form. The judicious exercise of 
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Occam's razor makes for economy within a system of axioms 
in that no unwarranted .assumptions are made, and no further 
assumption is made than necessary, thereby preventing the 
development of a system which is extravagant. Again, intu-
ition comes to the fore in support of this view. The prin-
ciple of conservation of energy whereby energy can neither 
be created nor destroyed even though its form may change 
seemingly provides incontrovertible evidence of the effic -
ient, and hence economical, physical processes by which 
nature functions. It may be suggested that aesthetic judg-
mente concerning the harmony of natural form may, in part 
at least, be dependent upon a demand for simplicity which 
has its roots in economy. 
1. Copi, SL, 179. . 
2. Feibleman, Q£1., 148. 
It should be emphasized that the three- criteria con-
sidered here--consistency, completeness, and economy--are 
best applied to formal deductive _aystems, such as mathemat-
ics • . This recommended application does not mean that other, 
less formal systems could not profit by the use of such cri-
teria. The case is otherwise; for instance, in determining 
the conditions sufficient for an adequate ontological descrip-
tion these criteria are among those most frequestly cited. 
Indeed, it may be questioned whether any criteria are more 
fundamental than those remarked upon above. Whatever the 
case, the conclusiveness of these criteria is far from deter-
minable, a fact that may be drawn from the examples above 
concerning mathematics, logic, and physics. And if such i s 
the case in strictly formal systems, one cannot hope to pro-
vide·- a higher degree of conclusiveness from an applicat i on 
of such criteria to aesthetics or a speculative ontological 
system. The point to be made is: that beyond the difficult -
ies encountered in a speculative system, there are inherent 
difficulties encountered even in judging the adequacy of the 
best criteria for that system. For an application to a spec -
ulative system these limitations are great, but not insuper-
able. However, until more adequate criteria may be develope~, 
or until these criteria may be developed more adequately,it 
is justifiable to assume that consistency, completeness, and 
eco.nomy may function as basic considerations in any treatment 
of ontology. 
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The next step is to relate the above criteria to e ach 
of the two schools of conceptual realism. 
2. Internal _Questions . of .Platonic Realism . and Nee-Realism._ 
1. Consistency. 
The question of the internal consistency of Plato' s 
Realm of Ideas has been previously touched upon. 1 It is rel-
evant to resta"te in part what was said earlier since this has 
a direct bearing upon the evaluation made of Plato's system. 
That is, certain Ideas specifically recognized by Plato such 
as the shuttle, auger, and bed and certain entities specif-
ically rejected by Plato as being Ideas such as mud, hair , 
and dirt, point to either an apparent inconsistency in the 
qualification of Ideas o.f sensible obj ecte, or a double s tand-
ard .in judging such Ideas. It is fair to assume that Plato 
recognized many of the difficulties involved in g iving Idea 
statue to all classes of sensible objects in that such a 
recognition engendered epistemological difficulties that 
were extremely involved.2 At the same time it is difficult 
to see why the basic characteristics imputed to the Ideas--
abstraction, individuation, eternality-- should not apply 
equally to all classes of sensible objects. Also, if there 
is to be an Idea of Bedness, why then should there not also 
be an Idea of Hairness in as much as both bed and hair ahara 
the same qualities essential to be classed as sensible ob j ects. 
1 . Chapter IV. 
2. Parmenides, 130. 
Xoreover, Plato's reason for rejecting such entities as mud, 
hair, and dirt from the Realm is quite premature, namely, 
"visible things like these are such as they appear to us, 
and I am afraid that there would be an absurdity in assuming 
1 
any Idea of them." One finds the implication here turning 
upon the Platonic distinction between the world of appear-
ances and the world of knowledge, with the assumption that 
visible things belong only in the world of appearances. The 
question arising at this point would be: How does Plato con-
ceive of visible things like shuttles, beds, and augers as 
other than appearances, and why would it not also be absurd 
to assume any Idea of them? The inconsistency of such a 
position seems to be real, unless it can be shown. that a 
double standard is warranted in judging Ideas of sensible 
objects. 
It may be recalled tha t Plato said that there are 
no Ideas of "hair, mud, dirt, or anything else that is vile 
2 
and paltry. 11 The implication is that there may be Ideas 
of things which are not vile and paltry, and apparently 
shuttle, bed, and auger fit this requirement. From this 
distinction it would follow that Plato maintained a two-
valued approach in recognizing Ideas of sensible things. 
But how, it may be asked, may one distinguish between the 
value of Bedness and the value of Hairness, both of which 
1. Parmenides, 130. 
2. Ib id., italics mine. 
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otherwise fulfill the required characteristics as Ideas? 
One would think that making this distinction would be left 
88 
to the province of physics which would determine 1, and accord , 
both bed and hair, gua phenomena, an equal value with regard 
to their material being. If the requirements of material 
being are met equally well by each, and if each meet the r e-
quired characteristics for Ideahood, then what kind of value 
system should be used? It may be suggested that the language 
which Plato used reveals some inkling of this, namely, by 
referring to mud, hair, and dirt as 11 vile11 · and 11 paltry. 11 
These words are neither part of the descriptive terminology 
used by physicists, nor terminology Plato uses anywhere else 
to describe other Ideas, yet they are value terms. The ques-
tion must be left open as to what sort of double standard of 
value, if any, Plato might have used to judge Ideas of sensi -
ble objects. Yet Plato's failure to warrant the use of such 
an apparent two-valued standard only serves to strengthen 
the indictment that a clear inconsistency has resulted in 
the determination of his ontology with respect to Ideas of 
sensible objects. 
This indictment is directed at the self-consistency 
of the system containing the axiom: "there is a single Form 
or real essence corresponding to each of these sets of many 
things." 1 The failure by Plato to meet throughout the expo-
sition of his theory of Ideas the specifications of such an 
axiom as in the case of mud, hair, and dirt, remains inexpli-
1. C~ornford, RP, 218 (Republic 507). 
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In passing, it seems unfortunate that the discussion 
which was presented in the Parmenides concerning the Forms 
was not carried through. It is a matter of conjecture if 
this omission were merely an oversight; or a gadfly:.· technique 
purposefully injected to arouse a response from his readers; 
or perhaps a literary device in characterizing the then 
young Socrates' immaturity, and hence not suffic:tently· de-
voted to dialectical rigor; or, as has been suggeste~, an 
attempt to avoid certain difficult epistemological consid-
erations. Yet the fact remains indelible that an inconsis t -
ency seems quite apparent, if not real. 
Questions concerning the internal c~nsistency, or 
lack of it, in the Nee-Realist's ontological system have 
b een directed ~at the exclusion of subsistent entities 
recognized, but at the kind of entities recognized. Typic al 
examples of such questions are: How can an entity such as 
"the round square cupola on Berkeley College" be admitted 
as a possible subsistent since the expression itself is self-
contradictory? Moreover, would not a system of possibles 
include an infinite number of such entities: white black 
snowballs, the proposition that "seven plus five equals four , 11 
and "a is true if and only if I?. is false?" The inclusion of 
such entities and. propositions, it is charged, militates 
against the internal consistency of such a theory to the ex-
1 
tent that it leads to a reductio ad absurdum. 
1. Quine, FLPV, 4~ 
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The Nee-Realists are well aware of the kind of treat-
ment given these so-called contradictory entities by other 
schools, and themselves have a ready answer for those who 
would impute to the Nee-Realist's doctrine a recognition of, 
say, square circles. First, the Nee-Realist seeks to estab-
lish that neither the mental nor the physical systems de-
l 
scribed by them contain any such entities. The fact that 
one can think contradictory propositions about such terms- -
such as square circles--does not mean that there are such 
entities to be found in either the mental or physical sys-
2 
terns. 
The thought of the round-square is a propositional 
content about a strictly unthinkable IT:--that it is 
to be a square, and it is to be round, and so forth. 
Further than this even thought cannot go: certainly 
even the in~er eye cannot grasp the square which is 
also round. 
Second, the question is narrowed to the metaphysical status 
that such entities might have, if any. The question is r e-
solved by making the crucial logical distinction between 
propositions on the one hand, and terms in relation on the 
other. 
It is found here that propositions may subsist together 
in a set although they are mutually contradictory, but 
that such contradictory propositions can never ge~erate , 
or be realized in, a system of terms in relation. 
Hence, only the universe of subsistent propositions can. accom-
1. Holt et al, NR, 363. 
2. Propositions expressing contradictions admit to manifold 
combinations as well, the "square-circular-hexagonal-
triangle," for i nstance. 
3. Holt et , ~, NR, 362. 
4. Ibid. 
b\\ 
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modate contradictory terms which in a mental system woulu 
be unth inkable and in a physical system would be impossible 
because both of these systems contain only terms in rela-
tion, such as conscious images . and physical objects, re-
spectively. The only meaning the Nee-Realist g ives to t he 
expression "square circle" is that of being a symbol for a 
contradictory proposition, and to this extent only do the 
Nee-Realists recognize such propositions as having any con-
tent. 
This recognition is primarily one of contradictions 
that occur in a logical system; such propositions are lim-
ited to membership in this system due to the axioms of t h e 
logical system. The mental system and physical system eac h 
has its own set of axioms that determine membership of t h a t 
particular system. Consistency requires that the axioms of 
one system determine the membership of that system only. To 
apply the axioms of one system to a different sy s tem would 
be, the Realist holds, tantamount to applying tpe propos i-
tions of the logicall y subsistent system to that of, say, 
the physical system. In such an application the inconsist~ 
ency that would occur may be shown in that the square c i rc le 
would then have to be admitted to the physical system as a 
space-time object. The Neo-Realists have striven to avoid 
the accusation that their system is inconsistent: (1) i n 
de nying the validity of the above modus operandi, (2) in 
restricting the membership of each system--logical, menta l, 
physical--through a determining set of axioms for each sys-
tem, and (3) in restricting contradictory propositions to 
the logical level of subsistents. 
ii Completeness. 
An attempt at a positive and decisive appraisal of 
Plato's system of Ideas in terms of completeness is doomed 
from the beginning. Partly this is so because Plato never 
1 
really formulated a system as such, · and partly because: he 
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gave no definite criterion for selecting class-concepts that 
were to be treated as Ideas.2 Given these drawbacka, and in 
the absence of documentation, only a conjectural attempt may 
be made to measure the completeness to which Plato's theory 
of Ideas could have been carried. Taking again a clue from 
the critics, it may be .ventured that there "is a Form for 
each of the qualities:. which may be possessed of a number or· 
3 
things in common." Such an interpretation is analogous to 
the class:•concept theory, and following this analogy Plato • s 
4 theory of Ideas may be similarly treated. That is, classes 
have the feature of entailing one another under certain qual-
ifying conditions in which case classes form another class, 
and these formed classes in turn enter into more inclusive 
classes until the level of the all-inclusive class, the uni-
versal class, is reached. 
1. Jowett, DOP, V.t, 440. 
2. vlindelband, HP, 121. 
3. Joad, G~P, 281. 
4 . Demos, POP, 67. 
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Fbllowing Plato's treatment, the Idea of the Good 
comes the closest to fulfilling the condition of inclusive-
1 
ness characterized by the universal class. In one instance 
the Idea of the Good is spoken of as the source of the ob-
jects of Knowledge which 
derive from the Good not only their power of being 
known, but their very being and reality; and Good-
ness is not the same thing as being, but even b~­
yond being, surpassing it in dignity and power. 
Similarly, a class is more than numerically identical with 
its members, that is, "mankind" is not the same thing ae 
the collection of all men. 3 The Idea of the Good may well 
be conceived to be that which embraces all the Ideas into 
a single class, the Ideas fitting "together like the pieces 
of a picture puzzle, and present when properly grasped by 
4 the intellect, a single coherent system." The Idea of the 
Good in this account would lose the ethical and causal em-
phasis which Plato assigns to it, and would be treated in 
the more clinically sterile manner of the Nee-Realist, name-
ly, as a logical construct. But such a treatment is in no 
1. It is not conclusive that Plato would have treated the 
Idea of the Good in this fashion. "Plato undoubtedly 
thought ••• that there are minor departmental hierarch-
ies within the world of Ideas; the question remains 
whether he thought that there is a grand hierarchy em-
bracing them all." Ross, PTI, 241. 
2. Cornford, RP, 220 - (Republic 508). 
3. Russell rejects the belief that -a class ma y b e equated 
with a collection of entities. The basis of this rejec-
tion derives from the contradiction about classes being 
or not being members of themselves. The number of class -
es will always be greater than the number of individuals 
s ince the totality of individuals will always constitute 
a class as~ a further "entity." Russell, IMP, 183. 
4:. Fuller, HP, I, 131 •. 
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sense derogatory; a comprehensible and ordered understanding 
of Plato's world of Ideas almost requires· some unifying ra-
tional principle. To treat of the Idea of the G-ood as being 
analogous to the universal class is to say no more · than 
"there must be a Form of Forms or essence of general ration-
ality in the universe, from which comes the power of the mind 
to assemble the Ideas in a consistent, comprehensible pictur e 
of the Real. 111 
The bearing which this interpretation has in judging 
tihe completeness of the theory of Ideas is to suggest that 
if _ the Idea of the Good may be conceived of as the universal 
class, the body of Ideas composing this class would offer a 
way of explanation superior to any other in explaining the 
completeness of such a system. The failure to meet a strict 
standard of consistency as pointed to earlier with respect 
to mud, hair, and dirt, does violence to the acceptance of 
this theory; parts belonging to the whole of the system were 
left out • . Herein there lies a documented basis for consider-
ing the completeness of the theory of Ideas as requiring 
completion; the Idea of the Good is not expressive of an 
inclusive whole since it does not account for its parts 
which, although ~eating the required characteristics of the 
system, are alleged not to be members of the whole system. 
In spite of this theoretical failure, there are those crit-
1. Fuller, HP, I, 131 • .. 
. 2-. Ibid. 
q -
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i c s who feel that this is not the case operationally. Thi s 
is t o say, there are critics who share a certain sympathy 
with Plato's position, at least to the extent that when g i v-
ing statement of it would say that nthere must be as many, 
Forms as there are possibilities of grouping things under 
headings and applying to them a common name. nl Perhaps t his 
means the same thing that Pla to meant when saying that .. cor-
responding to each of these sets of many things, we postula.te 
2 
a single Form or real essence.n Even in the absence of pre-
cise statement from the dialogues to support this view, such 
a view may be considered more adequate in terms of explain-
ing comp leteness' than are the otherwise metaphorical descrip-
tions offered by Plato. 
If any one feature of the Nee-Realistic position 
stands out, it is the headlong attempt to account for all of 
reality, and to do so as objectively and completely as poss i--
ble. Considering the ontolog ical status of possibility, 
enough has been said in characterizing what possibility in-
volves to assess its logical implications.3 In as much aa 
the Neo-Realist' s Realm of Possibility is equated with being 
to the extent that the content of being is included to an 
ontologically exhaustive degree, possibility is complete by 
definition. This definition is not so sacred that it re-
mains unchallenged, but the Neo-Realist is convinced that 
1. Fuller, HP, I, 131. 
2. Cornford, RP, 218 (Republic 507). 
3 . Chapter III, above. 
a fai1ure to understand that which is entailed by the mean-
ing of possibility is the basis of contention. 
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The Neo-Realist believes that axioms such as "All 
Being is object and objectivett which prescribe the inclusive 
nature of possibility are adequate for the logically subsi s t-
ent members of the Realm. Moreover, the Neo-Realist is satis-
fied that his account of contradiction dispenses with any 
otherwise internal inconsistencies in the system. And final-
ly, with the membership of possibility so extensive as to ex-
haust the content of Being, from the point of view of the 
Neo-Realist the major conditions for a complete ontological 
system have been met. 
iii. Economy. 
The question of determining to what extent the role 
of economy measured in Plato's theory of Ideas meets with the 
same problems cited earlier, namely, the lack of a system a s 
such, and a l ack of criterion by which to judge which class-
concepts should be treated as Ideas. Again, despite such a 
drawback an attempt may be made to consider the theory of 
Idea s as it was expressed, and from this attempt to judge the 
value of such a theory in terms both of its theoretical econ-
omy and ontological economy. 
In explaining the diverse and manifold nature of sim-
ilar ity in experience of phenomena, Plato's adoption of the 
theory of Idea s served to appease the demand for abiding char-
acteristics within the framework of nature. Qualities and 
relations could now be meaningfully linked together without 
regard for temporal attrition to which they were subject. 
Rational concepts requiring a basis of identity were also 
made stable, whereas 
if the qualities themselves are always altering, the 
sensations which are defined by these constantly alter-
ing qualities are undifferentiated. Such an account of 
the world involves the denial not only of fixed states 
and determinable processes but also of the laws of con-
tradiction and the excluded middle. The data of phen-
omenal change, then, logically req~ire the hypothesis 
of immutable and immaterial ideas. 
The cases of epistemology and ethics were parallel, for both 
required the doctrine of Ideas if intellection is to have a 
basis in other than what Plato called ttright opinion. tt 2 In 
all other areas the hypothesis of the Ideas satisfied the 
necessary and sufficient requirements of saving the intrin-
sic quality of experience. Thus a single, concise postula-
tion was adequate to function as the basis for what might 
have been developed more systematically. But other consid-
erations aside, the theoretical economy of the theory---when 
thought of as a simple axiom required to interpret total re -
ality--is best demonstrated by its application. This value 
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is fully and adequately jUstified through the scope and depth 
of its claim since it "makes it possible to consider the three 
spgeres of existence, cognition, and value as phases of a 
single unified cosmos. tt3 
1. Chernisse, Art.(l936), 454. 
2 • Ibid • ' 4 4 9. 
3. Ibid.' 456. 
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The question of the ontological economy within Plat o 's 
system would normally require further explication of the s t a te-
ment "corresponding to each of these sets of many thing s, "Vre 
1 postulate a single Form or real essence." In the absence of 
such, one must look to the number of entities to which Plato 
awards the status of Ideahood, and to the number of probable 
entities that would qualify as Ideas in light of the state-
ment quoted above. The number of Ideas mentioned by name in 
the dialogues is, indeed, small; the implication of "each of 
these sets of many thing s" would obviously increase this num-
ber considerably, the total of which would be crucial in t ak-
ing headcount of the Ideas. Even so, this question must a l so 
remain unanswered, since Plato admits relations between some 
Ideas whereas not between others. The ontological economy, 
then, of Plato's system remains indeterminate; however,· if 
one holds that ontolog ical economy varies inversely with the 
numb er of entities included within the system, Plato's con-
servative and guarded approach tP the admission of certain 
classes of Ideas would resolve in his favor the question 
whether his system of Ideas may be characterized as econom-
leal. 
In so far as Nee-Realism's theory of possibility ie 
essentially a logical extension of the basic Platonic theory 
of Ideas, the same app lication of economy may be used to me as-
ure both theories. However, there are two senses in which 
l. Oornford, RP, 218 (Republic 507). 
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" l ogical extension" is meant which re quire explanation. In 
one sense the extension broadens the theory of Ideas itself 
to a logical extreme to include the modal of logical possi-
bility. In this sense the distinction is essentially one of 
projecting the implications entailed by the theory of Ideas, 
as such. In the second sense the Ideas of qualities, rela-
tions, negative notions, and of sensible objects recognized 
by Plato as the entities which member the Realm of Ideas be-
came the subsistent terms and propositions which membered the 
Nee-Realist's Realm of Possibility, together -vri th all other 
possible terms. In this sense there is both quantitative and 
qualitative change. The qualitative change is made when t h e 
substantive Platonic Ideas are abstracted still further by 
the Nee-Realists sD as to be considered as purely logical ent-
ities. The difference is not so much one of kind as one of 
emphasis. Quantitative change involves the addition of an in-
definite number of subsistents; it is in this way that the 
ontological economy (not of the theory, but of this applica-
tion to the Nee-Realist's system) is affected. The result is 
not one of duplicating any one subsistent, but rather to sug-
gest a near-infinite number of possible relations into lihich 
a subsistent may enter. The ontological economy of such an 
application to the basic theory becomes questionable both on 
grounds of aesthetic appeal as well as logical i mplications . 
It vlould seem to be the case that the 11 third man11 argument 
wit h which Aristotle belabored. Plato's theory of Ideas would 
have equal application concerning the Nee-Realist's theory of 
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subsistents. The prospect of postulating a near-infinite number 
of subsistents to account for every possible relation of any 
one subsistent would i mply an indefinite process. To this 
charge the Nee-Realists offer no ready solution. And unless 
one is prepared, figuratively at least, to equate possibility 
with infinitude there is a question whether there can be any 
solution. But if one is prepared to make this equation, the 
question of economy must be forgotten. 
To consider the theoretical economy of the Nee-Real-
ist's view is another question. Again, the statement "All 
Being is object and objective" serves as the prime axiom of 
the system which, due to its universal character, makes fur -
ther i mplementation seemingly redundant. Hence, an assess-
ment of the theoretical economy of the Nee-Realistic position 
would derive its force from the broad, uneconorn ica .. l i mplica-
tions of this axiom. 
3. The Reality of _Universals. 
The Realist's position concerning the reality of Ideas, 
or subsistents, as well as the entire question as to the 
possibility of i mputing a separate reality to such entities, 
has not gone uncontended. Historically, this question is 
Parallel to the argument concerning the reality of universals. 
Accordingly, in as much as the possibility of the reality of 
universals obviously presumes the entire ontolog ical commit -
ment of the Realists, it is incumbent upon them not to beg 
101 
any question which may either deny or radically modify the 
foundation of such a metaphysics. This is to say, a de-
fense of their theory of ontology necessitates a decisive 
defense of the theory of universals expressed by such an 
ontology. The defense of universals made by the Real ists 
is thus aimed at the allegations made by two principal 
opponents, the conceptualists and nominalists. 
i. Objections by Conceptualists. 
The Conceptualists do not dispute the Realist's 
view that there are such entities as·-· universals, but. they 
go on to modify the Realist's doctrine by claiming that uni-
versals have no reality apart from the particulars in which 
they inhere, except as concepts in the mind. That is, al-
though universals are more than mere · names, they are mind-
made and do not possess an independent reality of their own. 
This view would seem to assert that there is a distinct uni-
versal for each definite object, particular, or class.- of 
objects having a mutual resemblance. On this issue the only 
concession the Realist is willing to make to the Conceptual-
ist is that the thought process is necessary for an aware-
ness- of universals. Yet a m . sequitur would occur if one 
is to conclude from this that the universals are exclusively 
mental, and hence entirely dependent upon the thought pro-
cess for their reality. At this juncture, agreement between 
the Realist and Conceptualist ends. 
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The rebuttals made by the Realist to the question of 
the reality of universals are worthy of mention both to sharp-
en the picture of the Realistic position presented thus far, 
and to present a defense of their position against their 
opponents. First, the Realists charge, the Conceptualists 
come dangerously close to identifying the concept and the 
universal. This is a mistake since a 
concept is not itself a universal, for the simple rea-
son that it is a concept, and a concept is something 
mental whereas a universal is not. But if a concept 
is not a universal, neither does it representt mediated 
knowledge. It is (not represents) that aspect of the 
universal which is available from that particular per-
spective which is occupiea by the knowing subject. That 
is to say, a concept may not be a universal but it re-
fers to one. The reference may be false-, as in the case 
of a false concept, or it may be true, as in the case 
of a true one; but the design to refer may always be 
attributed to the concept. 
The identifying of the concept and the universal, the Real-
ist believes·, would result in the impossible position of 
identifying thought-the-process with thought~the-content. 
On the other hand, the conceptual process is an 
important link in the mediation of knowledge which takes 
place between the independent universal and the universal 
as known. In so far as thought appeals to an objective 
basis culminating in the Realist's notion of universals, 
it becomes patent that this basis, if objective, must pos-
sess: a reality equally independent as that of the objective 
reference of thought during the mental process· of entertain-
1. Feibleman, Ont., 577. 
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ing the particular thing through perception. This is to say, 
if thought could never arrest the universal such that similar, 
diverse, and even contradictory experiences lost all meaning, 
then a pragmatic value to be gained by the recognition of the 
universal would also be lost. Even so, the proof that the 
universal is mind-dependent is not forthcoming. Moreover, it . 
is difficult to countenance, the Realists argue, why thought 
as process should be believed capable of recreating the cor-
responding yet identical universal each time the process func-
tions in terms of the objective referent. 
A second and more forceful contention against the 
conceptualist view has been voiced collectively by men such 
as Ewing, Price, and Russell. This contention fi.nds its ba-
sis in the language function which, it is claimed., the Con-
ceptualists have failed to evaluate correctly. The Realists 
hold that if there were no such things as universals our lan-
guage would 
not apply to the real world. There would be no point 
in calling New York, London, Paris, Philadelphia all 
towns, if they had nothing in common, and if they have 
something in common, 1that something is presumably an objective universal. 
Universals which find expression in common nouns such as "town" 
are equally well expressed by adjectives, prepositions, and 
2 
verbs, each of which denotes a significant universal. On 
the one hand, adjectives and common nouns express qualitie s 
1. Ewing, FQP~ 212-213. 
2. Russell, POP, Chapters IX and X. 
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properties of single things, whereas prepositions and verbs 
tend to express relations between two or more things. At 
this point, the Realists attempt to show that universals ex-
pressing relations form a far better basis for argument than 
do universals of qualities. That is, relations although re-
quiring terms to relate do not in and of themselves exist in 
the same sense as do qualities. The relation 11 north of" in 
the statement nEdinburgh is north of London" does not have a 
spatio-temporal coordinate like that of either city named. 
This unique character of relations, claim the Realists, is a 
kind of universal for which the Conceptualist cannot account, 
since there is no particular to correspond to the relation in 
question. Nothing mental is or need be presupposed in the 
fact that Edinburgh i .e north of London, moreover, if Edinbur gh 
and London ceased to exist, this would not alter the essential 
nature of the relation "north of.n Thus, the universal "north 
of" belongs to an independent world which the thought process 
apprehends but does not create. 
ii. Objections by Nominalists. 
The arguments voiced by the Conceptualists in their 
attempt to discredit the Realist's doctrine of the independ-
ence of universals are voiced with equal conviction by the 
Nominalists. The Nominalists, however, go a step further to 
renounce even the possibility of universals, and grant a value 
to those general words used by the Realists as that of nomen-
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clature merely. For the Nominalists, actual particulars are 
the only reality. Several objections to this account, in-
cluding those previously made to the Conceptualists, are wor-
thy of mention. 
Traditionally, the accusation is made against the 
strict Nominalist for his failure to account for the nature 
of change. Given the particulars of which the existential 
world of the Nominalist is composed, and given the incontro-
vertible nature of change taking place in this existential 
world, the Realists question how the Nominalist can adequate-
ly defend the universal, unchanging aspect of such change 
which is perpetually taking place among the particulars. 
Change is "inconceivable and contradictory except in terms 
of and in contrast with something that does not change." 1 
Thus it would appear that the problem of relations, using 
change as a further case in point, finds no immediate solu-
tion within a metaphysics which espouses the reality of ac-
tual particulars exclusively. 
A more liberal interpretation of Nominalism is open, 
one which recognizes the Nominalist's acceptance of univer-
sale as fictione. It remains necessary, though,. to meet the 
criticism offered under this interpretation by the Nominal-
1st's use of general terms, or words, as descriptive of eev-
eral resembling particulars. Yet the Nominalist who indicates 
that a similarity obtains among certain selected physical par-
1. Feibleman, Ont., 70. 
106 
ticulars and who makes use of general words to describe this 
similarity is again faced with the necessity of explaining 
the meaning of similarity, or resemblance, which relates the 
individual particulars. The general words offered by the 
Nominalist which bespeak resemblances--although denied a 
status as universals--none the less are found to express 
more than a mere description of the particular terms or re-
lata when cast in propositional form. An example is the case 
of "two plus two equals four" which seems to be concerned 
with the resemblances of the particulars 11 two11 and 11 four. 11 
The case is otherwise, urge the Realists, because many prop-
ositions which seem to be concerned with particulars are 
really concerned only with universals. Such a view receives 
support when considering the meaning to be derived from the 
above example, inasmuch as reflection shows that these sev-
eral words, 11 two11 and 11 four", which indicate the existence 
of couples, do not make an assertion about any actual cou-
ples. The meaning of the proposition may be applied to ac-
tual couples, but the meaning should also remain constant of 
the relation of two plus two throughout eternity even though 
no such application is made. The conclusion the Realists 
draw from this is that general words extend wel l beyond the 
narrow application the Nominalist would accord to them, and 
may be seen to exhibit an ~priori, universal feature as in 
the above example. 
Accepting the traditional definition of Nominalism, 
a variation of the previous criticism can be leveled with 
certain force. The Nominalist claims that a resemblance 
among several objects warrants applying the same: name to 
all of them. But strictly speaking, a common name is not 
any more real than a general name or universal name by the 
Nominalis~s own definition. The common name'~an' is no 
more real than the universal "Man." Hence, 
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the nominalist solution of the problem of universals 
thus fails through being insufficiently drastic in the 
application of its own principles; it mistakenly applies 
these £rinc iples only to "things••, and not also to 
words. 
A device often used by the Nominalists to repudiate 
the Realist's use of object language derives its form from 
Russell's theory of descriptions. It may be recalled that 
Russell became concerned over what he regarded as a "muddle-
headedness" about the nature of existence that had been oper-
ating for over two millennia. This confusion, says Russell, 
is caused by the attempt to attribute some sort of existence 
to entities which do not rightfully possess existence; and 
as a case in point, Russell mentioned the "golden mountain" 
when one makes the statement' "The golden mountain does not 
exist." For Russell, the subject term ngolden mountain" 
becomes a syntactical entity, for we may transpose the state-
ment "The golden mountain does not exist" into the statement 
uThere is no entity £. such that 1 2£. is golden and mountainous' 
is true when 2£. is £., but not otherwise." Thus existence is 
1. Russell, HWP, 661. 
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asserted only of description. The Nominalist concerned with 
excoriating from the language any expressions which possess, 
a misleading ontological commitment accepts Russell's tech-
nique of the foregoing, and himself goes on to apply it to 
1 
such general terms as 11 honesty, 11 "equality,n or the like. 
That is, rather than allowing the statement "Honesty is (or 
is not) such and such,n the Nominalist is anxious to change 
such an expression to read 11Whoever is honest is a person 
who does (or does not do) such and such, and not otherwise ! 1 
All general words, claim the Nominalists, are amenable to 
such treatment, and inasmuch as such words may be particu-
larized with regard to their application, there is no basis 
for the Realist to found his ontology using these general 
terms. In answer to this, the Realist would deny the Nom-
inalist his claim on the grounds that such a linguistic re-
duction is deliberately artificial, and is, moreover, con-
cerned only with existent things rather than the subsistents 
which populate the Realist's world. The Realist would draw 
the further distinction that purely linguistic considerations 
as treated of by the Nominalist are not subject to the same 
criterion as those of extra-linguistic considerations which 
an ontology involves. Given this, the Realists counter all 
such attempts by the Nominalists to limit ontology to dis-
course about individual things and names of those things. The 
1. Ryle, Art.(l~51), 21. 
ontologica,l dimension for the Realist is such that it is im-
possible that it be reduced· to the dimension of the linguist-
ic universe. 
iii. Universals of Error. 
Perhaps the most delicate issue of any Realist view 
regarding the nature of universals was raised by the Nee-
Realists when admitting universals of error as elements of 
their ontological structure. The basis of such inclusion 
followed the same form of the argument as did that of recog-
nizing universals. As in the case of the proposition "two 
plus two equals four" the Realist claimed that the assertion 
was real as a hypothetical statement even though no applica-
tion of it be made to actual things. Therefore,, actual cases 
did not determine its ontological character. Similarly, in 
the case of ficticious entities, ghosts, unicorns, griffins, 
these entities need no existential counterparts to determine 
their status as real subsistente. All deliberate, and non-
deliberate fictions, and those errors which arise at the per-
ceptual level have their ontological counterpart in the Realm 
of Possibility. It but remains for consciousness to apprehend 
universals of error, regardless of whether or not the percept-
ual counterparts are, in fact, present. By taking this posi-
tion the Neo-Realists have, in effect, logically extended the 
scope of the Platonic system to include all possible entities. 
It is because of this adaptation to the theory of universals 
that the Nee-Realists have been accused of overzealousness 
in their attempt to construct a comprehensive ontology to 
include all possible elements of being. 
In justification of this view the Nee-Realists in-
dicate that the Platonic system, beyond being too conserva-
tive, was also unwarranted exclusive in that mathematical 
and moral categories dominated his metaphysics. To avoid 
such exclusive particularity, the Nee-Realists believed it 
necessary to avoid special categories or condit i ons which 
might limit their own ontological system. A further point 
the Nee-Realists made in defense of their theory was that 
metaphysics was logically prior to epistemology 1, with the 
consequence that a system of verification operat ing at the 
epistemic level did not in any way determine the antecedent 
condition, the level of being. Thus the positivist's ob-
jections--that certain entities recognized by the Nee-Real-
ists have no perceptible counterpart; that verification is 
essential in determining the reality of entities ; hence, 
ontological entities failing to meet the criterion of per-
ceptible verification have no reality--are specious, say 
the Realists. 
~~0 
The question of ficticious relations is a more point-
ed one for the Realist in view of his earlier dependence upon. 
a doctrine of relations. Criticism has been leveled at the 
vacuity which results when treating of mathematical relations 
between mythical entities 
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such as 'the ratio of the number of centaurs to the num-
ber of unicorns'. If there were such a ratio, it woul d 
be an abstract entity, viz. a number. Yet it is only by 
studying nature that we conclude that the number of cen-
taurs and the number of unic£rns are both 0 and hence 
that there is no such ratio. 
The Nee-Realist is, by virtue of his defense of possibility, 
required to defend the view that there is such an hypotheti-
cal entity as the ratio C/N, and that such a ratio is an ab-
stract entity at the ontological level in the same sense that 
the ratio between the number of horses and the number of deer 
is an abstract entity at the ontological level. The differ-
ence between the two examples, argue the Nee-Realists, takes 
place not at the ontological level but at the epistemological 
level. Whereas the ratio between the actual number of cen-
taurs and the number of unicorns is non-existent; the ratio 
between the number of horses and the number of deer is an 
actual number, based upon headcount. The study of nature 
may net s.uch a figure, but the appeal to this kind of verif-
ication is limited due to the space-time character of the 
data as opposed to the total scope of the elements included 
in an ontological system. 
The lack of conviction one gains from entertaining 
such a view stems from the feeling that such a description 
of reality is valueless as an explanation of the real, phys-
ical world. Logical subsistents are too ethereal for empir-
ical-minded philosophies. But empiricism is not the measure 
1. Quine, FLPV, 3f. 
,G.. 
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of either success or failure in defending a theory of uni-
versals; moreover, such success or failure is as inconclu-
sive as the speculative system which the Realists are attempt-
ing to describe. However, within the framework of the Real-
istic tradition, the Neo-Realists escape the criticism--~ 
that of narrowness--aimed at Plato. The strength of the 
Neo-Realist's view derives primarily from the absence of 
logical objections to it. 
4. Possibility -M- Explanation. 
Inasmuch as a theory of possibility lies at the very 
heart of the modern development of Realism, the importance 
of such an explanation becomes material in questioning the 
value of such a development. To understand the Neo-Realist 's 
theory of possibility, the question of definition must fir s t 
be answered. Possibility for the Realist is represented by 
the most inclusive of all classes, the universal class, since 
it is membered by individuals, the class of individuals, of 
classes, the classes of classes, and so on. The intent is 
that of exhausting all possible terms and all possible rela-
1 tionships that take place among such terms. This heroic 
position, the Neo-Realist would believe, is the only answer 
to a thoroughgoing ontological realism. 
In opposition to this view of possibility, there has 
been considerable controversy. Four broad criticism are out-
1. Evans, NROR, 82 •. 
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standing. The first of these is lexicographical, charging 
that the expression "everything possible" is so vague and so 
broad in scope and implication as to be quite meaningless. 
Such a definition, it is urged, is tantamount to the po-si-
tion that given a theory broad enough, and a set of premises 
of one's choosing, that anything can be proved or disproved. 
Moreover, to set up an ontological structure which stretches 
comprehension beyond the elastic limit, even though possibly 
true, is purely trivial. What the Nee-Realist would purchase 
in comprehensiveness, he pays for in terms of order, economy, 
and clarity. Any definition of possibility thus stated vio-
lates the requirement that a definition neither be too broad 
nor too narrow, thus failing at the onset. 
A second criticism is based upon the belief that an 
ontological system should exhibit aesthetic proportion, and 
regards the modal of possibility as producing an ontological 
slum, 
a breeding ground for disorderly elements. Take, for 
instance, the possible fat man in that doorway; and, 
again, the possible bald man in that doorway. Are they 
the same possible man, or possibly two men? How do we 
decide? How many possible men are there in. that door-
way? Are there more possible thin ones than fat ones? 
How ·many of them are alike? Or would their being alike 
make them one? Are no two ·possible things alike? Is 
this the same ·as saying t~at it is impossible for two 
things to be alike? Or, finally, is the concept of 
identity simply inapplicable to unactualized possibles? 
But what sense can be found in talking of entities 
which cannot meaningfully be said to be identical with 
themselves and distinct from one fnother? These ele-
ments are well-nigh incorrigible. · 
1. Quine, FLPV, 4. 
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The criticism bears with it the added conviction that a doc-
trine of possibility carries with it a denial of the meaning-
fulness of contradiction--alleging, say, the round square cu-
pola on Berkeley College to be real--which, beyond having no 
1 intrinsic appeal, leads its defenders to a reductio.saa abstlr'dum. 
A third criticism of a theory of possibility is gr ound-
ed essentially in the question of its pragmatic ·value. The 
seemingly infinite membership of the Realm of Possibility pro-
motes the opinion that there is an element of the ridiculous 
involved, since no sort of method can be devised to warrant 
such an assertion. And the retort offered by the Realists 
that no method can be devised to disprove it simply does not 
ring true. Some form of verification seems intuitively nec-
essary upon which to base important ontological presupposi-
tiona. Moreover, the extent to which contradictory possibles 
seem to measure in such a theory, and because this often leads 
the Realist to posit a doctrine of the meaningless of contra-
diction, it is seen that a severe methodological drawback 
arises, making it impossible to devise an effective test of 
2 
what is meaningful and what is not. 
The fourth and last of the broad forms of criticsm 
that may be leveled at such a theory is even mor,e serious 
since it directs itself to the very conception of possibility 
held to by the Realist. Taking the statement "All Being is 
object and objective", the conclusion may be drawn that poe-
1. Quine, FLPV, 4. 
2. Ibid., 5. 
,,::;, 
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sibility also is object and objective. Such a statement would 
then becomes subject to the criticism imposed by the theory of 
types. 1 This theory asserts generally that no universal prop-
osition can be demonstrated true for existence, which is to 
say that a proposition (universal) cannot be allowed to apply 
to itself. Thus if the Realists persist in limiting the de-
scriptive nature of their ontological system to one true prop-
osition concerning its existence, then according to the theory 
of types such a system would break down in that the Realists 
would be in the contradictory position of asserting that it 
both was a member of itself and was not a member of itself. 
It is due to the failure to provide effective answers 
to such criticisms as these that the modern realistic theory 
of possibility loses much of its force of conviction which 
it might otherwise have garnered from a logical extention of 
Platonic realism. 
1. The comprehensive class ••• which is to embrace everything, 
must embrace itself as one of its members. In other wordsr 
if there is such a thing as 'everything', then 'everythin~ 
is something, and is a member of the class of 'everything • 
But normally a class is not a member of itself. Mankind for 
example is not man. Form now the assemblage of all classes 
which are not members of themselves. This is a class: is it 
a member of itself or not? If it is, it is one of tho se 
classes that are not members of themselves, i.e. it is not a . 
a member of itself. If it is not, it is not one of those 
classes that are not members of themselves, i.e. it is a 
member of itself. Thus by the two hypotheses--that it is, 
and that it is not, a member of itself--each implies a con-
tradictory. This is a contradiction." Russell, IMP, 136. 
I (. 
CHAPTER VI 
C.ONCLUSIONS 
Through a direct comparison of Platonic and Nee-Real-
ism concerning their respective ontological positions, a ma-
jor tension between these two views was clearly indicate~ b y 
the modifications made by the Nee-Realists to the position of 
their early Platonic forebears. This tension was created by 
the Nee-Realist's doctrine of possibility. Certain differ-
ences between the two views resulted due to the commitments 
imposed by this doctrine. 
First, whereas the content of the Platonic Realm of' 
Ideas was affected, and thus limited, due to mathematical and 
moral qualifications, the Neo-Realist's Realm of Possibility 
was unrestrictively membered by logical constructs. 
Second, in his development of the theory of Ideas, 
unless Plato be inteFpreted to mean that the Ideas be treated 
as simples at the phenomenal level, the explanation of novelty, 
meaning new synthesis, is sharply hampered. The Neo-Realist's 
theory of possibility is not directly confronted with this 
problem of novelty since the theory has, so to speak , already 
accounted for every possible entity, new or otherwise. 
Third, Plato's treatment of general terms was seen to 
permit one to speak accurately about the kind of thing that 
extends beyond experience, helps one to speak about the co-
herence of experience, and to speak, if at all, about 
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the yet unexperienced only if the general terms have a mean-
ing relation of identicalness to the universal which it pur-
portedly connotes. The Nee-Realist's theory of possibility 
expressed a formally structured calculus of subsistent terms 
stated in propositional form and which propositions were in-
clusive to _an ontologically exhaustive degree. 
Fourth, Plato's account was epistemological; he ex-
plained error as resulting from the absence of Reason, thus 
precluding real Knowledge. In such cases it often meant that 
one mistakingly conceived of certain contradictory predicates 
to be attributed to a subject-Idea. The Nee-Realists recog-
nized error as a reality to the extent that they made error 
objective through awarding it a log1co-ontolog1cal status. 
Consideration was given to the value of the criteria 
used to measure the Realistic position. Consistency, com-
pleteness, and economy were regarded as the most important 
criteria. In the case of consistency it was seen that Plato 
did not give recognition to certain entities--hair, mud, dirt--
which fulfilled the requirements as stated by the primary ax-
1om governing the qualification of the Ideas. The Neo-Realists 
endeavored to achieve consistency by restrictine; the membership 
of each system--logical, mental, physical--through a determin-
ing set of axioms for each system, and by restrlcting contra-
dictory propositions to the logical level of subsistents. In 
the case of completeness if one accepts an interpretation of 
Plato's Idea of the Good as being analogous to the logician's 
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universal class, a case for the completeness of :Plato's 
theory of Ideas is possible. The Neo-Realist's theory ofl' 
possibility is such that the content of being is, from the 
point of view of the Neo-Realist, exhausted. In the case 
of economy, the theoretical economy of Plato's theory of 
Ideas made it possible to consider the three spheres of 
existence, cognition, and value as phases of a single uni-
fied cosmos. The question of ontological economy for Plato 
must be deferred due to the absence of a treatment of the 
subject by Plato. Neo-Realism seemed to fail to meet any 
standard of ontological economy due to the apparent infin-
itude of subsistent entities, or terms, which they recog-
nized. As a matter of theoretical economy, the statement 
nAll Being is object and objective" served as a- primary ax-
iom for the Ne.o-Realistic system. 
Certain objections to a theory of possibility must 
be registered which have the collective force of placing the 
ontological value of such a theory in question. These objec-
tions indicate that a theory of possibility is suspect due 
to: {1) the failure of the Neo-Realists to provide an ade-
quate definition; (2) the violation of all sense of aesthetic 
proportion; (3) a failure in providing an effective test upon 
which to base or warrant their assertions about conceptual 
reality; and, (4) the failure to justify their position in 
light of the criticism based- upon Russell's theory of types. 
From such considerations, the thesis seeks to high-
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l ight an inconclusiveness which .obtains in the two Realistic 
views presented here. To give a picture of reality within 
the framework of the Realistic tradition, a reliance upon a 
theory of universals was fully in evidence by both the Pla-
tonic and Nee-Realistic views. If one accepts a theory of 
universals, the question then arises as to what extent one 
is willing to be committed. On the one hand, a question of 
inconsistency and incompleteness arose in considering the 
strict Platonic position due to a circumecripticm of the 
universals accepted. On the other hand, a dissatisfaction 
resulted on the grounds of non-economy if one accepted the 
uncircumscribed theory of possibles recognized by the Nee-
Realists. Yet if one is going to accept a theory of universals, 
but reject both the Platonic and Nee-Realistic lnterpretatione 
of this theory for reasons of being too narrow and too broad, 
respectively, the question then remains as to exactly what 
sort of reconciliation between these two views, if any, would 
constitute an acceptable position. As yet, no such reconcil-
iation has found general acceptance; however, at least certain 
important qualifying conditions--consistency, completeness, 
and economy--are seen to structure any such acceptance. Hence, 
only to the extent to which such conditione adequately qualify 
the two Realistic positions, may acceptance of those positions, 
complete, or partial, be found. 
ABSTRACT 
The problem of the thesis is to compare critically 
the major ontological questions which serve to distinguish 
two outstanding schools of philosophy representing the real-
istic development of thought. These schools are referred to 
as Platonic Realism and Neo-Realism:. Some of the questions 
treated- deal with such matters as ontological extensity, 
novelty, linguistics, the subordinate character of epistem-
ology, and the nature of error--for each of which distinct 
explanations are offered by both realistic schools. More 
precisely, these problems became prominent as a consequence 
of the latter-day Nee-Realist's refusal to accept the onto-
logical limitations imposea by the theory of the earlier 
Platonic Realists. In the light of this, ontological spec-
ulation stands as a decisive cleavage between the Platonic 
Realist and Neo-Realist. Accordingly, the particular theory 
of ontology expressed by each of these schools must come un-
der examination for purpose of evaluating their claims. Up-
on the basis of such an examination, certain important qual-
ifying conditions are found to be necessary in order to de-
termine the value of conceptual realism. In the last analy-
sis, the thesis is designed to highlight these qualifying 
conditions. 
Plato's theory of Ideas was seen to give an early, 
but comprehensive, statement of one dimension in the real-
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istic view of reality. This dimension was composed exclu-
sively of Ideas. These Ideas, which later became known as 
universals, were imputed to have certain important qualities: 
abstractness, individuation, and eternality. None of these 
qualities may be omitted when speaking of the various divi-
sions by which the Platonic Ideas may be divided into class-
es; these classes consisted of Ideas of qualities and rela-
tions, Ideas of negative notions, and Ideas of sensible ob-
jects. The account given by Plato of the relation between 
the Ideas and the actual physical world led to a view of 
immanence which Plato most often preferred to call "partic-
ipation." This account was never sufficiently or adequately 
explicated by Plato for his readers to have a clear and dis-
tinct understanding of such a relation. In its broadest 
form, Plato's ontology was inclusive of three definite dimen-
sions-~Being, the Ideas, and phenomena--which, taken collect-
ively, exhaust the content of the Platonic universe. 
The Neo-Realist movement began as a polemic against 
both idealism and subjectivism, and as a polemic it sought to 
show the difficulties with the positions that it condemned. 
From this polemic, however, there emerged a definite and pos-
itive commitment. This commitment included such aspects of 
the Nee-Realistic thesis as a theory of independence in cog-
nition, epistemological monism, logical analysis, a plural-
istic ontology, and an external view of relations. These 
positive features were seen in operation through the Neo-
1'2.'2. 
Realist's presentative theory of perception that sought to 
uphold a relational theory of consciousness based upon a 
universe of being best described as a "neutral mosaic." The 
basis for such a theory of reality was found to center in 
the Nee-Realist's doctrine of subsistents which was seen to 
be expressive of an all-pervasive logical atomism. 
A direct comparison of the two schools of realism 
gave light to certain differences between them due to the 
modification imposed upon Platonic Realism by the Nee-Real-
ist's doctrine of possibility. Most important, the content 
of the Platonic Realm of Ideas was affected, and thus limit-
ed, due to mathematical and moral qualifications, whereas 
the Nee-Realist's Realm of Possibility was unrestrictively 
membered by logical constructs. An explanation of novelty 
as it is effected by the theory of Ideas was seen to be re-
stricted in application to the level of phenomena, however, 
the Nee-Realist's theory of possibility readily accounted 
for novelty at any level. The nature of the propositional 
structure in the Nee-Realist's theory of possibility was . 
found to be more inclusive in accounting for reality than 
the Platonic treatment of general terms which demanded a 
relation of identicalness between the Idea and the general 
term. Whereas Plato's account of error was epistemological, 
the Neo-Realist awarded error an ontological status based 
upon their theory of possibility. 
Certain objections to a theory of possibility must 
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be registered which have the collective force of placing the 
ontological value of such a theory in question. These objec-
tions indicate that a theory of possibility is suspect due 
to: (1) the failure of the Nee-Realists to provide an ade-
quate definition; (2) the violation of all sense of aesthetic 
proportion; (3) the failure in providing an effective test upon 
which to base or warrant their assertions about conceptual 
reality; and, (4) the failure to justify their position in 
light of the criticism based upon Russell's theory of types. 
From such considerations, the thesis seeks to high-
light an inconclusiveness which obtains in the two Realistic 
views presented here. To give a picture of reality within 
the framework of the realistic tradition, a rellance upon a 
theory of universals was fully in evidence in both the Pla-
tonic and Nee-Realistic views. If one accepts a theory of 
universals, the question then arises as to what extent one 
is willing to be committed. On the one hand, a question of 
inconsistency and incompleteness arose concerning the strict 
Platonic position due to a circumscription of the universals 
accepted. On the other hand, a dissatisfaction resulted on 
the grounds of non-economy if one accepted the uncircum-
scribed theory of possibles recognized by the Nee-Realists. 
Yet if one is going to accept a theory of universals, but re-
ject both the Platonic and Nee-Realistic interpretations of 
this theory for reasons of being too narrow and too broad, 
respectively, the question then remains as to exactly what 
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sort of reconciliation between these two views, if any, 
would constitute an acceptable position. As yet, no such 
reconciliation has found general acceptance, however, at 
least certain important qualifying conditions--consistency, 
completeness, and economy--are seen to structure any such 
acceptance. Hence, only to the extent to which such con-
ditions~ adequately qualify the two Realistic positions, may 
acceptance of those positions, complete, or partial, be 
found. 
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